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Module 11 Suggested Reading
Introduction
This module contains reprints of several articles related to the ideas of
stages of development and self-regulation and a bibliography of books and a r t i c l e s
that you may wish to study after you complete the workshop.

To pravtde you w i t h examples of applfcations of the instructional techniques
that you were introduced to in the workshop, and t o make available a bibliography
t h a t you can use for further study.

If you would like further background information on Piaget's theory a s related
to physics instruction, read one or more of the three reprlints selected from AJP
acd TPT t h a t are included in the instructional materials for this module. If
you would like additional information on Plaget ' s theory tn general, read t h e
article by Piaget r e p r i n t e d here or consult the books and articles l i s t e d in the
bibliography -- most are available in paperback and many can be obtained in any
college or universTty books tare.

This module contains the following materials:

1.

Reading list a £ suggested books and articles.

2.

Joe W, bi&nnon and John W. knner, r re Colleges Concerned w i t h
Intellectual Development?" American Journal of Physics 39, 1047 (1971).

3.

John W. Renner and Anton E, Lawson, "piagetian Theory and Instruction i.n
Physics, " Physics Teacher g,
165 (19 73)

4.

John W. Reaner and Anton E. Lawson, "Promoting Intellectual Eevelsp=nt
Through Sc fa c e Teaching, " Physics Teacher 11,273 (1973).

5,

Jean Pfaget, ~ournal'ofResearch in Scfence Teachfng Vol. 2,
pp, 176-186 ( 1 9 6 4 ) .

6.

Anton E. Lawson and Warren T. Wolman, "Physics Problems and the
Process of self-~egulation" The Physics Teacher 13, 465 (1975)

.

.

Module 11 lnstiiictional Materials
Books

-

,

1.

Anderson,DeVito,Pyrli,Kellog,iCochmdo~erandWeigand,Deve~oping
Through Science, Prent ice-Hall , N. J 1970.

.

Glil-dren ' s-inking

,

2.

~ u t hM. Beard, An Outline of Piaget's Developmental Ps)tcholdfy for
Students and Teachers, Basic Books, Inc., N.Y. 1969.

3.

David Elkind, Children and Ado1 escence, Interpretive Essays on
Jean Piaget,
-- Oxford Univ. Prcss.

4.

Mchard I. Evsns, Jean P i w t :
N.Y. 1973.

5.

H a n s G. Furth, Piaget for Teachers, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs,
M.J. 1970.

6.

Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Qpper, Piawt 's Theory of Intellectual
Development, Prentice-Hall, f n c . , Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . 1969.

7.

Rf chard M. Gorman, discover in^ P i a s t , Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.,
Columbus, Ohio, 1972.

8.

~ z r b e lLnhelder and Jean Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking from
Chfldhood r b AdblcsCetlce, Msf c Books, N.Y. 1961 (There is a paperback
classroom e d i t ion of t h i s book)

9.

The Man and His Ideas, E.P. Dutton, Co.

John L. Phillips, Jr. , The Ori-s
of Intellect : Piaget 's Theory,
W. H, Freeman and Co., San Francisco, 1969.
Norton & Co., New York, 1970.

10.

Jean P i a g e t , ~ e n e t i cEpfstemology, W.W.

11.

Jean Piaget , The Psycholopy of Intelligence, Littleffeld, Adams , & 'CO
Paterson, N. J. 1968.

12.

.,

Jean Piaget, Six Psychological Studies, Vintage Books, Random House,

N.Y. 1967,
13.

Jean Piaget, To Understand is To Invent, Grossman Publishers, N.Y.

14.

John W, Renner, Robert F, Bibens, and Gene G , Sheperd, Teacbfng Science
2n the Secondary School, Harper and Row,' N.Y. 1974, Chapter 4 .

15.

M. F. Rosskopf, L, P. Steffe, and S. Tkback, E d s . , Psagetian CognitiveDevelopment Research and Mathematical. Education, Reston, V a , : National
Council of Teachers of Hathematics, 1971.

1973.

Selected Artitles

1.

Entire issue, Journal of ksearch i n Science Teachfng, Val. 2, 1964,
(Articles by Piaget, Karplus, Ausubel.and Duckworth).

2.

Arnold 8. Arons, "Anatomy of an Introductory Course in Physical science,"
Journal of College Science Teachhg, A p r i l 1972.

3.

Arnold 8. Arons, "Toward Wider P u b l i c Understanding 0 5 Science," American
Journal of Physics, 41, 769 (1973).

4.

Arnold B. Arons and John Smith, "Definition of Intellectual Objectives
in a Physical Science Course for Preservice Elementary ~eachers,"Scfence
Education, 58, 3 , pp. 391-400, 1974.

5.

B. S. Craig, "The Philosophy of Piaget and its Usefulness to Teachers of
Chemistry," J. Chem Ed., Dec. 1972, 807-809,

6.

David Elkind, " ~ i a g e tand ScXence ducati ion. " Science and Children, Nov. 59 72.

7.

Elizabeth F. Karplus and Robert Karplus , "Intellectual Development Beyond
Elementary School I: Deducttve Logic," School Scfence and Mathematics,
LXII, 5 (May, 1970) pp, 398-406.

8.

Robert Karplus and R i t a Peterson, "Intellectual Development: Beyond
Elementary School 11: Ratio, a S~rveg,'~School ScSence and Mathematics,
70, 9 @ceder, 1970j, pp, 813-820,

9.

Edward G. Palmer, "Acceleratfng the Child's CognStfve Attainments Through
t h e Inducement of CognStlve Conflict : An interpretation of the Pfaget ian
P o s i t f on. " Journal of Beseafch 5n Science Teaching, '3, 318-325 (1965).

10.

~ e a nPiaget
*
, "Intellectual Evolution from Adolescence to Adulthood, "
Human Demlopment , 15, 1 (19 7 2 ) .

Tenn.) cost approx. $2000. An alternative choice might be
to purchase a PDP/8E with high-speed paper tape reader
(total cost, approx. $11 NO), or equivalent from another
manufacturer.
Teaching Computing in Universities (Her Majesty's
Stationery Ofiice, London, 1970); Ph,ys. Bull. 21, 482
(1970).
A survey of four computer dictionaries gave no definition for minicomputers. From The New York Times,
5 April 1970, Sec. 3, p. 1:

M a x i Computers Face Mini Conjlict, by William 13.
Smith.
Mini vs Maxi, the reigning issue in the glamorous
world of fashion, is strangely enough also a major
point of contention in the definitely unsexy realm of
computers,
The definition of a minicomputer depends on to

whom you are speaking. Descriptions range from
electronic ca~lculators to the IBM System 3 that
sells for $42 000.
A consensus opinion would probably include as
minicomputers machines that cost less than $25 000
and that include some t,ype of input-output device
such as a teleprinter, a memory of about 4000 wards,
and circuitry capable of performing calculations
under the control of stored programs written in some
form of higher-level comput,er language such as
FORTRAN or BASIC.
The major manufacturer of minicomputers is the
Digital Equipment Corporation. Other major makers
include the Hewlett-Packard Corporation, the Data
General Corporation, Varian Associates, Honeywell,
Computer Automation, Irtc., Motorola, the Raytheon
Corporation and Mini-Computer Systems, Inc.

Are Colleges Concerned with Intellectual
Development?
JOE W. McKJn'NON

Oklahoma City University
OkZuhoma City,Oklahozna 73206
JOHN W . R E K N E E
University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma 73069

IIYTRODUCTION

Are colleges and universities making irladeyuate
ev'aluations of student ability to think logically?
Is the unrest today in many universities caused by
student evaluation of problems ba,sed upon emotion rather than logic? Do student claims that
(Received 14 December 1970; revised 8 March 1971)
curricululns are irrelevant, trivial, and inadequate
in terms of the magnitude of the problems facing
T h e assumption i s often made by college professors tha.t mankind today have substance, or are these
incoming freshman students think logically. Using tests students unable to evaluate logically the structure
designed by the Swiss psychologist J e a n Piaget to evaluate
logical thought processes, the authors found that 66 of 151 and necessity of those curricula? These questions,
freshmen exhibited characteristics of tlze concrete opera- together with suspiciorls voiced by various
tional thinker, vihile another 39 did not meet the criteria professors of science about the inability of their
for formal operations. Professors further compound the freshman students to think logically about the
problem by failing to recognize the kinds of experiences szrnplest kind of problems, led the authors to
incoming freshmen students must have to move toward
more logical thoughb. X c K i n n o n , using a newly developed question whether or not most college freshmen do
inquiry-oriented science course based u p o n Piagetian think logically. This doubt about the ability of the
criteria, found a highly signiJicant difference between entering freshman to think logically led to the
those students who were exposed to tlze course and like following liypotllesis: Tht: majority of entering
students who were not. T h e authors concluded that second- college freshmen do not come to college with
ary and elementary teachers do not take advantage of
inquiry-oriented techniques so necessary to the development adequate skills to argue logically about the
of logical thought because college professors do not provide importance of a given principle when the context
examples of inquiry.-oriented tenchzng.
in which it is used is slightly altered.
Since these students have been accepted by
boards of admission that based their decisions
upon high school transcripts and various establislied ent>ranceexaminatio~issuch as the Anlericarl

.T. W . McKinnon and J . W . Renner

TABLE
I. A comparison of operational level of 131 students
on Piagetian data.

Male Female Total number
Formal

25

8

33

Per
cent

25

or not this was true for American college freshmen,
i.e., had those students become formal operational?
A STUDY OF THE ~ ~ 1 ~ 1OF
l - COLLEGE
y

FRESHMEN TO THINK LOGICALLY

McKinnon3 studied responses to tasks given
131 members of the freshman class a t an Oklahoma
Concrete
16
50
66
50
university in which students had to think
logically about problems of volume conservation,
Mean Piagetian
12.82 9.45 Average 10.74
score
reciprocal implication of two factors, the elimination of a contradiction, the separation of several
variables, and the exclusion of irrelevant variables
College Test (ACT) and the Scholastic Aptitude from those relevant to problem solutions. These
Test (SAT), a different means of evaluation was tasks had initially been developed by Inhelder and
sought. The evaluative system used is one based Piaget2 for determining the patterns of thought of
upon the ability of the student to think critically children and the ages at which changes in those
about problems, the answers to which would be thought patterns occur.
found in his experiential background and could
Table I presents the test results for these 131
not be derived from memorized data.
students using the foregoing tasks and the criteria
specified by Inhelder and Piaget for demonstrating
WHEN DO STUDENTS BEGIN TO THINK
formal operational thought. Each student was
LOGICALLY?
graded from 0 through 4 on each of the tasks.
The scheme of evaluation of the ability to think Should a student score a total of 14 or more points
logically which was used has been developed and on the five tasks, he was judged as definitely being
verified by a Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget, at the formal operational stage. To achieve 14
during many years' research with children. There points, he had to score a t least 3 points an the
is, however, no indication that his work has been
extended to include entering college students, I8
particularly American students. I n addition, no
work can be found with American children which 16
verifies his conclusions that children begin to
think logically between ages 11-15.
14
Piagetl found that children progress through
various stages of mental manipulation and that
these steps cannot be circumvented. Prior to
Piaget
thinking about abstract ideas, a student must 10
score
undergo a period of physical manipulation of
objects using the basic principles upon which the 8
abstraction to be developed depends. This stage
Piaget identifies as the concrete stage of thought. A 6
student may handle concepts quite adequately, but
until he has had many manipulative experiences 4
he cannot recognize those concepts in the context
of a broader generalization, of which the manipula- 2
1
tive experiences and the concepts are simply a
subset. Inhelder and Piaget2 found that from 11- ' 2
6
J!
4
I
22
6
30
34
Composite ACTscore
15 years of age most Swiss children should become
formal operational, i.e., capable of abstract logical FIG. 1. A comparison of ACT score versus Piagetian score
t,hought. The concern of this research was wbet,her for 94 freshman students.
Post-concrete
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20

32

25
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tasks for \vhiclz 4 points were possible. If a student
scored an average of 2 points or less on each of the
five taslis, he was judged to be at the concrete
stage of operations. Those students who scored
more than 10 but less than 14 points were judged
to be moving from the concrete stage to the formal
stage of thought.
The findings, as sho15-n in Table I, are that 50y0
of the entering college students tested were
operating completely a t Piaget's concrete level of
thought and another 25% had not fully attained
the established criteria for formal thought. The
average score for all students was 10.74, with the
males scoring significantly higher than females.
An examination of the performance of the students
on the various tasks used follows:
1. Of the college freshmen tested, 17% of them
did not conserve quantity (the result of a change
of form), while another 10% failed to recognize
equivalence of volume. Thus, 27% of those
students tested were a t the lowest concrete
operational state or less.
2. Reciprocal implication involved the student
in the problem of reflecting a ball and the necessity
to relate incident and reflected angles. This task
\%-assecoi7d only to the problem of density in the
number of failures recorded-64% scored 2 or less.
3. The elimination of a contradict ion involved
the student in relating weight and volume of
floating and sinking objects in a meaningful way.
More than $ of those tested did not relate weight
and volume. Typically. they recognized weight
only. Seldom was there a proportionality expressed; 67% of the students tested on this task
were concrete operational.
4. The separation of variables task gave
evidence that 50% of entering college freshmen
could not recognize tlze action of a potential
variable and find a way to prove the action of that
variable.
.5. The task of excluding irrelevant variables
showed that 33% of the students tested could not
eliminate variables of no consequence in a swinging pendulum, while another 18% could do no
more than order the effects of weight.
I n the research, a comparison was made of the
score obtained by each student on the various
Piagetian tasks given him and this score was correlated with his ACT composite score. (See Fig.

1.) A graph of these two scores sho~vs that
Pearson product-moment correlations were high
for those students scoring a t the average ACT
composite of 22 or better, but correlations of
-0.05 were found for students scoring less than
that average. The university where this study was
made ranks high in terms of the average ACT
scores when compared with all other colleges and
universities in Oklahoma4 and is well above
average for all regions of the United state^.^
P,lmost 75y0 of that university's entering freshmen, however, were either partially or conipletely
concrete operationaI. What evidence exists, therefore, to demonstrate that logical thought can be
promoted among all levels of students?
CAN INQUIRY-ORIENTED COURSES
PROMOTE LOGICAL THOUGHT?

The University of Oklahoma Science Education
Center has, for some time! been investigating t.he
effects of inquiry-oriented teaching upon both
teachers and pupils. Various new courses in science
wiliich utilize the inquiry approach have been
evaluated. Porterfield6 compared teachers of
reading who had inquiry educational experiences
in science with t,hose who had not. He found t,hat
the former tended to use more questions requiring
analysis and synthesis and other high-level
cognitive thought patterns than did the latter
group. Wilson7 found much the same in a study of
30 classes of elementary children when fift,een of
the teachers had been exposed to inquiry experiences in science and fifteen had not. Schmidt8
found similar results by investigating t,he teaching
in social studies done by teachers who had and had
not been involved with inquiry in science. Friot9
found in astudy of seventh,eighth, and ninth grade
science t'hat courses placing emphasis upon the
inquiry approach allom7ed students to be able to
function at a much higher level of logical thouglit,
than those courses in which students did not have
that inquiry experience.
Stafford used the development of conservation
reasoning in children as an evaluative tool to
determine whether or not inquiry-oriented science
experiences move first graders toward the acquisition of concrete operational thought. The specific
unit he used was Material Objects.10 Stafford
found: ". . . those first grade children who have
experiences with the unit achieved the ability to
B J P Volume 39 / 1049

TABLE
11. A comparison of the growth in logical thought processes of the experimental and control groups
-

Pre-test
Females
Males

Post-test
Females
Males

Group

Stage

Experimental

Formal
Post-concret e
Concrete

4
14
24

11
6
10

14
17
11

16

Formal
Post-concrete
Concrete

4
6

14
6
6

7
11
18

17
7

Control

26

conserve much more rapidly than did those
children who did not have these experiences.""
Material Objects is an inquiry-centered unit and
Stafford concluded: ". . . children so taught do
show more rapid intellectual development than do
those children not having such experiences."ll
Finally, McKinnon,I2 in a study of the effect of
an inquiry-centered science course on entry into
the formal operational stage of concrete operational freshman college students, found a highly
significant difference between those students
enrolled in the course and a like group who had not
been exposed to the course.
The data of Table I gave evidence of the ability
of students to think logically. The data of Table I1
show the effect of the inquiry-centered course
upon freshman students' ability to thinli logically.
A net gain in favor of the experimental group
resulted in 15 students moving into the formal
stage of thought-compared
with six for the
control group. The post-concrete gain was,
respectively, five and six, with the experimental
group showing a net movement of 20 out of this
category compared with 12 for the control group,
a net gain of more than 50% for the group exposed
to the influence of the new science course. The
ina.teria1 of the science course did not include
references to the tasks which were part of the test
instruments; therefore, changes in ability to think
for
caused by added
inquiry. Another comparison in terms of the mean
Piagetian scores for the two groups is shown in
Table 111.
After obtaining- individual pre-test-post-test
differences and summing them up for each group,
an F ratio of 6.24 was obtained. This value is
significant in favor of the test group a t the 0.001
1050
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Females
10
3
-1 3

8
3

3
5
-8

2

Net gain
Males

5
2
-7
3
1
-4

Total
15
5
- 20

6
6
- 12

level of confidence; therefore, the hypothesis must
be accepted that a properly designed course in
science for freshman college students does enhance
their logical thought patterns by increasing their
ability to hypothesize, verify, restructure, synthesize, and predict.
The preceding research gives evidence that
students do not thinli logically. However, research
carried out on newly developed courses does give
evidence that the logical thought processes can be
enhanced. Therefore, m7ho is a t fault and what
steps must be taken to alleviate the situation?
AN EVALUATION O F EDUCATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY USING T H E INQUIRY
APPROACH

If students do not think logically when tlley
enter college, who has not discharged his responsibility? The immediate answer to the foregoing
question is, the high school. That answer, however,
needs to be examined.
Piaget states formal operations begin to emerge
around 11 years of age But Friotgfound that 82%
of eighth and ninth grade children (ages 13 and 14
years) were still concrete operational. Thus,
children probably enter senior high school two to
three years behind the age set by Piaget for
TABLE
111. Pre-test and post-test Piagetian mean scores
for both experimental and control groups.
Group

Pre-t,est
Post-test

n

Experimental
Piaget score

69
6Y

10.77
12,32

n

62
62

Control
Piaget score
10.81
11.14

Colleges and Intellectual Developrr~ent

entering into formal operation. While some of this
age difference might be attributed to differences
in the samples of Piaget and Friot, the entire 82%
cannot be. The answer to the question of who is
responsible for the lag in intellectual development
seems t,o be the elementary school. But that
answer, too, needs to be examined.
Begin that examination with another question.
Who is teaching in the elementary and secondary
schools? Teachers who have been educated in the
existing colleges and universities. Those teachers
have been subjected to four years of mainly
listening experience. They have been lectured to,
told to verify, given answers, and told how to
teach. Lest you think the foregoing happens
entirely in the colleges and/or depart'ments of
education, remind yourself that all the con,tent taken
by a teacher (which represents a substantially
greater number of credit hours than do courses in
education) is taken in other colleges and/or
departments. Teachers are, in other words, not
having the kinds of experiences with inquiry which
Piaget says they must have in order to allow
logical thought processes to develop. Future
teachers are not having learning experiences in
college which mill permit them to learn the value
of inquiry in educating a child. The foregoing
rather dogmatic statement was substantiated by
Gruber13 when he found that only 25% of those
attending NSE' Institutes showed interest in
inquiry-oriented science heaching, while Torrance14
found that only 1.4% of elementary and 8.4% of
seconda,ry social studies teachers listed independent and critical thinking as important educational objectives. These stat'istics suggest that
pre-college teacl~ersplace little value upon logical
thought as an outcome of 12 years of schooling.
Considering the paucity of research on implementatlion of logical thought as an educational
objective, these educators' values will not change.
The responsibility, t,hen, for the small percentage
of high school students at'taining formal operations
rest's in part a t the door of the inst'itutions of higher
education. They have assumed that their role is to
t>ell. Future teachers, therefore, assume t>hat
telling is teaching and when they get their first
class, t'hey tell, tell, t'ell! All the while, very little,
if any, intellectual development is going on. If,
then, a college student develops logical t,houglit,
such development is more by accident than design.

One of the criteria Piaget cites for intellectual
development is that of social transmission. Just
possibly more intellectual development goes on in
dorms, fraternities, s~rorit~ies,
and student hangowts than in the classroonn because social transmission occurs in these pla,ces and lit'tle occurs in
cla,sses. To test our assertions, m-all<down the hall
of any building on any campus and stop outside
an:y classroom door and listmento who is talking.
In most instances only information is being transmitted by the in~truct~or.
Stafford and Renner" hypothesized that
". . . specialized educational experiences in inquiry-centered science teaching encourage a
tea,cher to become sensitive to children, functionally aware of the purposes of education, and
equipped to lead children to learn 1101~to learn in
all subject areas." The importance of this hypol.hesis is in the phrase " . . . all subject areas.",
for inquiry methodology is not only the province
of science, but all t,he other disciplines as well.
Unfortunately, few other tea,ching areas have
recognized the importance of the inquiry approach.
'rNith t'he exception of a fexv new courses in t'he
social science areas, most educators have chosen
to ignore the lead taken by science and mathematics in devising new courses from kindergart.er1
through the 12th grade. 111many cases, the colleges have failed to use inquiry even when
teaching t,he new curricula,. This point was \$-ell
illustrated by Gruber. Therefore, the blame must,
in the last analysis, be placed, a t least partially,
upon the shoulders of those who t'eacli a t the
college level and who insist upon ignoring the
rapidly accumulat,ing evidence in favor of tlie
inquiry approach.
Renner and St'afford also pointed to the necessity of the teacher becoming ". . . functionally
aware of t'he purposes of education . . ." which in
far too many cases they are not now. Unless
teachers are aware of the prima,ry purpose of
education being t'he development of Ilie learner's
intellectual ability, t'hey will not pursue teaching
by giving the student opportunities for exploration using all his senses. Rather, they will continue
to teach students what t'he teacher want's them to
know and not what the students want to learn.
Finally, the total accumulat,ion of research to
date leads to the following hypotheses: (1) The
secondary educational experience does not no\\-
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promote logical thinking in most students. (2) An
abundance of inquiry-oriented courses taught by
teachers who are products of college and university
professors who practice and profess inquiry must
come into being in the secondary schools before an
alternative to the first hypothesis can be accepted.
Those experiences will have to be developed by
many colleges.
Those hypotheses have profound educational
implications since a serious problem has been
shown to exist and the means for its alleviation
have also been shown to be available to the
profession. If colleges and universities do not
try to solve the problem by assuming the responsibility for the intellectual development of
their students, but continue to look a t their
primary purpose as the transmission of information about the several disciplines, the elementary
and secondary schools mill continue to fail in their
mission of truly educating student,^. The needed
changes, however, can come only through acceptance of inquiry by all of those who teach the
teachers.
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Radiation Field of a Charge Moving on a Straight Line
J. 0. ALEVISOS
Varvakion Arormal School
Athens, Greece
(Received 11 September 1970; revised 21 April 1971)

A derivation of the radiation field of a charge accelerating o n a straight line i s presented that makes use of
Gauss' law in a direct manner and does not make use of
the concept of lines of force.

We derive the radiation field of an accelerating
point charge from the following assumptions:
(1) electric effects are transmitted with the
velocity c ; (2) Gauss' law holds good in all
inertial frames of reference; (3) the electric field
is known.
a charge
These are the assumptions made by J. R.
Tessman and J. T. Finnell to derive the radiation
field of a point charge moving on a straight line.
However, we shall not make use of the concept of
lines of force, and Gauss' law shall be used in a
most direct way.
Consider the following kinematic sequence on a
straight line of a particle with the charge q:
(a) The charge moves with constant velocity
vl until t = to. At t = to we designate its position by
0.
(b) The charge moves with constant velocity
v2 thereafter. We only suppose that UI, v2 are less
than c.
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Piagetian Theory
and Instruction in Physics
John W. Renner and Anton E. Lawson

Jean Piaget and his associates have been gathering data and formulating
important theoretical observations about the intellectual development
of children since 1927. Although it has taken American psychologists
and educators a relatively long time to become acquainted with his
work, it is becoming apparent that we can gain much by a careful evaluation of his efforts and their educational implications.
Numerous texts1 have become available in recent years attempting to
explain Piaget's theory and its educational significance. The primary
purpose of this paper is similarly to explain his ideas, and further to
expand a scheme of instruction and classroom procedures that arise as
a consequence of that theory.' When possible these ideas will be put
forth using examples in physics context in an effort to elucidate
difficult ideas.

Mental Structures
A central idea in Piaget's work and fundamental in understanding his
theory is the concept of mental structure. It would be satisfying to be
able to indicate the physiological and chemical nature of these structures, but at this point in the study of human mental functioning that
is not possible.3 Instead their existence in the brain is hypothesized
from observable behavior; determination of their exact nature awaits
further research. These hypothesized mental structures function to organize the environment so that the organism can function effectively.
In this sense the construction of these structures carries adaptive value
for the individual. An analogous situation is found in the genetic adaptation of evolving species. Basically, then, mental structures represent a
more or less tightly organized mental system to guide behavior.
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During development of the human infant to adulthood, these structures
must be built within the brain. A complete developmental sequence of
the structures is not genetically given to the child; they must be learned.
According to Piaget, the building and rebuilding of these mental structures is what underlies the process of intellectual development. These
structures control how and what we think and guide behavior. In other
words, structures actually represent our knowledge.
Since science educators are deeply concerned with intellectual development and the building of mental structures about everything from the
metric system to the theory of relativity, two questions need to be
asked: (1) How are structures built? (2) Once the structure is built
is it static or can it be altered?
These two questions are not mutually exclusive, and we will answer the
second one first. Structures can be altered, and that may be a more than
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adequate definition of education-the building and rebuildof structures. The answer to the first question should then
give us good insights into how learning takes place and how
instruction should be planned.
The Building of Mental Structures - A Problem
An important point must be made before examining the
process by which mental structures are formed according to
Piaget. Structures do not come from simply making a mental record of the world by keeping eyes and ears open. Unfortunately, it would appear that many teachers subscribe
to this view. Work done by Van Senden with congenitally
blind persons provides an interesting example of this point.4
These persons, who had gained sight after surgery, could
not identify objects without handling them. They were unable to distinguish a key from a book, when both lay on a
table. Also they were unable to report seeing any difference
between a square and a circle. The important idea t o note is
this: Whether the task is to simply distinguish objects in the
environment or complex relationships such as F=ma, ac celeration, or velocity, the ability to develop the under.
standings requires much more than a simple photographing
of the environment.
According to Piaget a person is unable t o perceive things until his mind has a structure which enables its perception.
Without the development of a mental structure things which
seem obvious to an adult, such as the difference between a
key and a book, a square and a circle, are simply not perceived by beginners. But this leads us to a fundamental
problem. If learning is the building or rebuilding of mental
structures, and if structures are needed in order t o perceive
and learn and are not derived from simply copying the external world, then where do they come from?
Plato's answer to this question was simple. The structures
were innate and developed through the passage of time and
the growth of the brain. Of course at the other end of the
spectrum is the belief that these structures derived directly
from the environment. This is the classical empiricist's view;
but we have already seen that this view is untenable.
Piaget rejects the Platonic view, except to admit that certain very primary structures must be present at birth.
Piaget's view is that the development of structures derives
from a dynamic interaction of the organism and the environment which he calls equilibration.
The Building of Mental Structures - Equilibration
From birth, basic structures enable the child t o begin interacting with his surroundings. As long as that interaction is
successful the basic structures continue to guide behavior.
However, owing to the child's inborn drive to interact with
his environment he meets contradictions, i.e., things which
do not fit his present mental structures. These contradictions produce a state of disequilibrium. In other words, his
present mental structures are disrupted and must be replaced. Through continued investigation and guidance from
others, the child alters or accommodates his disrupted mental structure. Once this is accomplished he is then able to
assimilate the new situation. The new structure that is developed is then tried. If the structure guides behavior so that
the child's efforts are rewarded (reinforced) the structure is

also reinforced. In this manner the child builds new mental
structures and adapts t o new situations.
The above-described process underlies all development according to theory. The entire process of development of
mental structures is viewed as a process of equilibration or
self-regulation. This process results in the development of
progressively more complex and useful mental structures.
The Building of Mental Structures - Contributing Factors
The role of three main factors, experience, social transmission, and maturation can be isolated in the process of
equilibration. I t is apparent that experience is a necessary
part of learning. With no contact with the environment, no
contradictions of present structures arise and no possibility
for further exploration into the situation that produced the
contradiction is possible.
There are basically two kinds of experience ---- physical, and
logical-mathematical. This distinction is important because
the different experiences lead to different kinds of mental
structures.
Physical experience is exactly what the phrase connotes actual physical action on the objects in the world. This
physical experience leads to the development of structures
about objects. At some point, however, the learner begins
t o see more in his interaction with the world than just objects. He sees that his actions with objects produce some
kind of order themselves. An example of this is when a
learner discovers that ten objects, when counted left to
right provide the same result as when counted right to left.
In other words, the action itself has properties. The learner
now can make the generalization that the sum of any set of
objects is independent of their order. Now the student has
a mental structure that he can utilize in many situations and
that is a logical-mathematical structure. The structures
then enable the learner t o operate logically within his environment. The basic behavioral patterns directed by the
mental structure are called operations. In the early structurebuilding stages the opportunity for the learner t o interact
with concrete material is mandatory.
Piaget has not projected to what academic level the necessity for interaction with material exists; he says, "...coordination of actions before the stage of operations needs to be
supported by concrete material."5 A literal interpretation
of that statement would be that, regardless of age, the student must have materials to perform actions with until he
can begin to utilize logical-mathematical operations. Our
research with kindergarten and elementary school children:
junior high school student^,^ and college freshmeq8 all
studying science, supports our interpretation of the foregoing quotation.
The factor of experience, then, helps students to build operational-structures which can ultimately lead them to think
abstractly about the world around them. In other words, it
is experience with the materials of the discipline that produces the person who can understand abstract content and
not studying abstract content which produces students who
can interact with the materials and invent abstract generalizations. This says to science teachers that the laboratory
must precede the introduction of an abstract generalization.
THE PHYSICS TEACHER

Fig. 1 . Jean Piaget. Photograph
by the Science Curriculum
Improvement Study.

Piaget's second factor, social transmission, also provides a
basis for structure building. The very young child - and
some not so young - operate from a very egocentric frame
of reference. He cannot see things objectively because he
always looks at them as related to himself. Such a thinker
cannot objectively view and/or evaluate anything. In order
to shake the learner from an egocentric view of anything, he
must experience the viewpoints and thoughts of others. He
must, in other words, interact with other people. If he does
not, he has no reason to alter the mental structures which
he gained from an egocentric frame of reference. Social
interaction can lead to conflict, debate, shared data, and the
clear delineation and expression of ideas. All of these require that the student carefully examine his present beliefs
which will, according to the Piagetian model, develop and
change structures. I n order t o have all of this happen, however, students must be encouraged to talk with each other
and their teachers. Data from an experiment must be shared,
discussed, retaken, and rediscussed. Students, "...should
converse, share experience, and a r g ~ e . "The
~ factor of
social interaction is valuable in building and rebuilding
structures, but it is insufficient because the learner c& receive valuable infornlation via language or via education directed by an adult only if he is in a state where he can understand this information. That is, to receive this information
he must have a set of experiences that enables him to assimilate this information.

Marurarion, the third factor, must also be considered. Evidence indicates that these structures require time t o develop. Old structures cannot be accommodated to new experiences a l l at once. The process of development is slow,
as any teacher can attest.
Perhaps this personal example will help clarify how these
three factors interact in the process of equilibration to
change structures. Our first contact with V=IR was a
rather traumatic experience. We vaguely understood that it
involved the conservation of energy, but concentrated upon
memorizing what the symbols meant and how to juggle the
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formula. In short, an advanced state of disequilibrium was
our lot! When meter readings were substituted for the very
abstract terms of potential difference and current, the symbols began to have meaning, and after a good deal of thinking equilibrium was achieved. Then a series circuit with one
source and more than one resistor and parallel circuit was
introduced. The notion that in a series circuit the total
potential difference, V t , of the source equaled the sum of
all voltage drops, Vi,i = 1,2,3,..n, around the circuit brought
on another disequilibration. Once again meter reading (objects) were salvation; we began t o really understand that

really was a conservation of energy statement. Now V=ZR
was a concept which was available for use and once again
equilibrium was achieved. Parallel circuits presented no
problem and Kirchhoff's laws were nearly obvious.
This example demonstrates that the science laboratory
clearly has a place in promoting equilibration and disequilibration. Data from an experiment can be very threatening,
because they too often produce disequilibrium. But to the
sensitive, concerned science teacher, disequilibrium is an
opportunity; he can now introduce the student t o the major
conceptualizations of the discipline which will produce
equilibrium. This sequence of events suggests that perhaps
the principal role of the teacher is to promote disequilibrium
and equilibrium, because through the process of equilibration structures are built and rebuilt. Equilibration proceeds through experience with the materials worked with
and the social interaction of those around us.

The Learning Cycle
An instructional technique incorporating much of Piagetian
theory has been developed and refined by the Science Curriculum Improvement Study, University of California,
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Berkeley. Their procedure is basically a three-phase process:
(1) exploration, (2) invention, and (3) discovery.
Exploration involves the students in concrete experience
with materials. As a consequence of these initial explorations, which sometimes may be highly structured by the
teacher or on other occasions relatively free, the learner
encounters new information which does not fit his existing
structures. This produces disequilibrium. At the appropriate
time, determined by the teacher, he suggests a way of ordering the experiences. In essence, the teacher invents a new
structure which often involves a new concept. This phase,
termed invention, is analogous to Piaget's structure building
and promotes a new state of understanding or equilibrium.
The question now is: Can the new situation be applied in
other situations? During phase three, discovey, further application of the inventions are discovered by the students.
Discovery experiences serve to reinforce, refine, and enlarge
the content of the invention.1°
Again an example from physics may help to clarify these
points. Experience in the laboratory with voltage and resistance, seeing the effect these have on current, and recording all these data is exploration. These exploratory experiences, if provided at the appropriate time, will promote disequilibrium and lead students to question relationships.
Since it would take a brilliant student to invent the notion
that V=IR , the formal statement of that relationship is left
up to the teacher. The teacher, having explained the relationship, has in effect provided a way of ordering the student's experience. This is invention. Now the student is in a
position to make discovery with this new concept. He can
apply it to various types of circuits, magnitudes of voltage,
current, and resistance, practically any type of situation he
can design. That is the true notion of discovery. Exploration, invention, and discovery are the three phases of the
learning cycle and represent a process which will lead the
learner to move from physical action to abstract mental
operations. Science in general - and in our opinion physics
in particular - has a unique opportunity to lead students
to build structures. Are we utilizing it? There is much evidence to suggest we are not."
Levels of T'hinking
Piaget's theory has gone further than describing how mental
structures are formed. He has outlined the basic structures
that dictate behavior from birth to adulthood. The structures fall roughly into four categories. Each category or
stage incorporates and adds to the structure of the previous
stages. If Piaget is correct, it becomes imperative for educators to understand these stages of development. They provide a possible key for adapting instruction to the learner's
capabilities. They further suggest types of activities
which could promote intellectual development.
The child at birth is in a state Piaget calls sensoy-motor.
During this period, which lasts until about 18 months, the
child acquires such practical knowledge as the fact that objects are permanent. The name of the second stage describes
the characteristics of the child - preoperational, the stage of
intellectual development before mental operations appear.
In this stage, which persists until around seven years of age,
the child does not, for example, reverse his thinking; he
exhibits extreme egocentricism, centers his attention upon

a particular aspect of a given object, event, or situation,
reasons transductively, and does not demonstrate conservation'* reasoning. In other words, the child's thinking is
very rigid.
At about seven years of age the thinking stages of children
begin to "thaw put" - they show less rigidity. The stage the
child has entered is called concrete operational Those struG
tures which permit the reversal of thinking et al., which are
denied a pre-operational thinker, begin to show themselves
as the child moves more and more deeply into the concrete
operational stage. The child can now perform what Piaget
calls mental experiments - he can assimilate data from a
concrete experience and arrange and rearrange them in his
head. In other words, the concrete operational child has a
much greater mobility of thought than when he was
younger.
The name of this stage of development - concrete operational - is representative of the type of thinking of this type
of learner. As Piaget explains this stage: "The operations
involved...are called 'concrete' because they related directly
to objects and not yet to verbally stated hypotheses."'3 In
other words, the mental operations performed at this stage
are "object bound" - operations are tied to objects. This
point must be firmly entrenched in the minds of teachers,
because when working with students who are moving
though this stage they must focus their teaching on the
object - the actuality - and not on the abstract. Density,
for example, is an abstraction - lenses are concrete.
As the child begins to emerge from the concrete operational
stage of thought, according to the Piagetian model, he
enters the last stage called formal operational. According
to Piaget, this occurs between 11 and 15 years of age. A
person who has entered that stage of formal thought "...is
an individual who thinks beyond the present and forms
theories about everything, delighting especially in considerations of that which is not."14 Formal operational thought
is capable of reasoning with propositions only and has no
need for objects. It should be pointed out, however, that
for this type of thought to occur it must be developed
through the use of objects. For that reason this type of
thought can be described as propositional logic. An analysis
of formal operations reveals that they "...consist, essentially
of 'implication' ... and 'contradiction' established between
propositions which themselves express classifications, seriatations, etc."15 The formal thinker can form hypotheses and
test them:To do this, he must isolate and control variables
and exclude irrelevant ones. This type of thought can truly
be described as abstract.
The maximum educational gain that comes from the study
of science is derived from the isolation and investigation of
a problem. Quite obviously this involves the formulation
and stating of hypotheses and using a form of thinking
which can be described as, if ..., then ,...,therefore. That is,
of course, propositional logic. In other words, science
teaching should promote formal thought. But it cannot do
so if concrete operational thinkers are asked to interact
with science on a fonnal operational level and their teacher
teaches them as though they think formally. Concrete operational learners must interact with science at that level; they
cannot do otherwise. Only then will they build the strucTHE PHYSlCS TEACHER
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tures that promote their intellectual development toward
formal thought.
Where are today's science students in the development of
formal thought? If the programs of study available for high
school physics are examined, for example, the fact that
they require the use of abstract thinking is immediately apparent. The same can be said for most of the new curriculum developments in science. As Kohlberg and Gilligan recently said: "Clearly the new curricula assumed formal
operational thought rather than attempting to develop it."16
Is such a statement justified? Can science taught at the
pre-collegiate and college levels promote formal thought?
What can teachers do, if anything, as they select and arrange
curricula and interact with students to promote formal
thought? A later article in this journal will address itself to
those questions.
[The second part of this article will appear in the May issue
of The Physics Teacher.]
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Promoting Intellectual Development
Through Science Teaching
John WmRenner and Anton E m Lawson

The previous article in this series, ["Piagetian Theory and Instruction in
Physics," Phys. Teach. 11, 165 (1973)J discussed the process of intellectual development and the intellectual level concepts of Jean Piaget
and briefly commented upon the relation of those ideas to teaching and
learning physics. The purpose of this article is to comment upon the
thought patterns of secondary school and first-year college students and
to suggest types of experiences students need to have to enable them to
move toward acquiring formal thought.
We start with the assumption that all students deserve the opportunity
to develop the capacity to think with the "If ..., then ...,therefore ..."
form - in other words, to develop formal thought. Three questions
immediately arise:
(1) What type(s) of thought do secondary school and first year
college students use?

(2) How can the student's level-of-thought be assessed?
(3) What can educational institutions do to change the type(s) of
thinking students do?

Levels of Thought, Students, and Content
If you reflect back to the first article we prepared on the topic of learning, you will recall that we pointed out that learners begin to leave the
pre-operational stage at around seven years of age. At this point, they
enter the concrete operational stage of thought and, according to Piaget,
move more and more deeply into that stage until somewhere between
11 and 15 years of age. That is the time when they begin to move into
the last stage of intellectual development - formal operational thought.
Now the transition from concrete to formal thought is of the utmost
importance to teachers who work with students in grades 10-12 in the
secondary schools and in their first years of college. If students have
achieved the ability to think formally, the teacher can proceed to lead
them t o deal in the great abstractions of science because they can think
with form, "if ...,then ...,therefore ...," or propositional logic. These
teachers need not be as concerned with providing students direct experience with the materials of the discipline as those teaching concrete
operational thinkers. But if students are concrete operational, they cannot think with propositional logic and all they learn will come from
interacting with the materials of the discipline. These statements carry
with them serious implications for science teaching, indeed for all types
of teaching which deal with abstractions. Therefore, the validity of
these statements must be carefully evaluated. At this particular time
such an evaluation has not been carried out to any satisfactory extent.
However, to any teacher who has had the experience of having his students simply not comprehend what to him seemed eminently clear,
Piaget's hypothesis becomes extremely compelling.
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Basically one can gasp why Piaget asserts that "if ...,then ...,
therefore,.." thinking is required to understand abstract
concepts if you understand the nature of the abstract concepts themselves. The abstractions in physics, as well as in
biology and chemistry, are in actuality models created by
scientists to explain observable data. These models do not
arise directly from the observations; rather, they simply
represent attempts to construct an explanation or model
which implies what is observed. The scientist creates the
model (we do not know how) and reasons ifhis model is
true, then consequences should be found. If the predicted
consequences are indeed found, he has therefore supported
his model. The process is hypotheticodeductive or in the
if ...,then ..., therefore ... form. For a student to fully grasp
the meaning of the abstract models he, too, must be able
to think in the if ..., then ..., therefore ... form. The inertia
principle, for example, has to be deduced and verified
from its implied consequences. Strictly speaking, it does
not give rise to observable empirical evidence.
Consider Newton's second law, F = ma. That law is always
stated (and properly so) in terms of the mass of a body.
Now mass is not a concrete concept - it is an abstraction.
All matter that students have experienced exists in a gravitational field. Therefore what students have experienced is
not mass but weight. This point is of little consequence to
a formal operational thinker; mass is an abstract concept
he can comprehend and do mental experiments with. To
succeed in understanding F = ma (particularly when identifying its units) however, the learner must be able to do
mental experiments with abstract concepts. Now look at
acceleration - a rate of change of a rate of change. A rate
of change is a concrete concept; miles/hour, cents/pound,
and poundslfoot are all situations with which a learner can
have concrete experiences. But when you change that rate
of change so that you are referring to miles/hour/second,
providing experience which will lead a student to that is
nearly impossible. (To make acceleration even more abstract, it is usually written, for example, as ftlsec?) About
the best that can be done is to let the student experience
the fact that as an object slows down, the time intervals required to travel equal distances gef progressively longer.
Now consider the experience students have had with forces.
Those experiences have no doubt been pushes and pulls and
have probably been measured in pounds. Now a student
takes an abstract quantity (mass) which he has not experienced and multiplies it by a second very abstract quantity
(acceleration) and produces a third quantity called force.
But here the force is not measured in pounds but in kilogram-meters/second2 and is called a newton. There is nothing concrete about that entire process. It is a complete abstraction. Now if a student is a formal thinker, he can probably handle that abstraction - he can't ifhe is concrete operational. Do not misread can't to mean "doesn't want to";
it means exactly what it says, can't.
Couple Newton's second law with the calorie, transverse
waves, the particle theory of light, the gauss and maxwell,
and the second law of thermodynamics and you have a
pretty good sampling of a first-year physics course. You
also have a fair list of abstractions. Those are abstract topics
for which formal operations are a necessity. How does a
teacher determine whether or not his class can handle such
abstract topics?

Assessing Student Level of Thought
What we have done in the area of determining student success with tasks which reflect formal operational thought
has been greatly influenced by four sources:
1. Bgirbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The Growth of
Logical TPlinking From Childhood to Adolescence (Basic
Books, New York, 1958), Chaps. 1-7.
2. m e Developmental meory of Piaget: Conservation
(John Davidson Film Producers, San Francisco, 1969).
3. Elizabeth F. Karplus and Robert Karplus, "Intellectual Development Beyond the Elementary School: I.
Deductive Logic," [School Sci. Math. LXX, 398 (May
1970)l.

4. Robert Karplus and Rita W.Peterson, "Intellectual
Development Beyond Elementary School 11: Ratio A
Survey," [School Sci. Math. LXX, 813 (Dec. 1970)l.
The foregoing sources contain many more tasks than will
be described here, and you are urged to try them. Here are
two tasks which we have used quite extensively.

( 1 ) The Conservation of Volume (Source 2, above).
This task requires two cylinders of exactly the same size but
having different weight (we have used one made of brass
and the other of aluminum); those properties of the cylinders are pointed out to the student. He is next presented
with two identical tubes partially filled with water and allowed to adjust the water levels until he is convinced that
each tube contains exactly the same amount. The student
is then asked if when the cylinders are put in the tubes, the
heavy cylinder will push the water up more, if the lighter
cylinder will push the level up more, or if the cylinders will
push the levels up the same. The examiner requires the
student to explain his answer, and often it is the explanations and not the initial responses that are most revealing of thought patterns. If the student completes the task
successfully, he has provided evidence of beginning formal
operational thought.
(2) The Exclusion of Irrelevant variables2 (Source
1, above). The student is presented with a pendulum whose
length can be easily changed and three different sized
weights which can be used for the pendulum bob. He is
told to do as many experiments as he needs to, using many
different lengths of string and all the various-sized weights
until he can explain what he needs to do to make the pendulum go fast or slow. Again, note that the examiner bases
his evaluation on the student's explanations. The variables
of string length, angle, and push are also pointed out to the
student. If the examinee recognizes that length is the only
relevant variable, he is about to enter into the formal operational thought period. If he not only excludes the irrelevant variables but hypothesizes a solution to the problem
and demonstrates his solution, he has entered the formal
period. If the student can state a general rule about pendula
in such a way that it can be tested, he is probably capable
of working with propositional logic. Although the concept
of an oscillating pendulum and its period is not an abstract
concept itself (its discovery and construction related directly to a concrete physical experiment), solution of the
pendulum problem does indicate the use of propositional
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logic and that is a prerequisite to the understanding of

abstraction^.^

The conservation of volume and the pendulum tasks were
taken by college freshmen. The results shown in Table I1
were obtained.

Student Performance on the Tasks
Physics is normally taught in the high schools to students
in grades eleven and twelve. We administered these tasks,
therefore, to 99 eleventh graders and 97 twelfth graders
from Oklahoma public schools. The schools were randomly
selected, and students in each selected school were also
randomly selected. Table I shows what we found.

Table II.Performance of college freshmen for formal
operational tasks,
Number of

Conservation

Exclu-

COllege freshmen

of volume

sion

Table I. Performance of formal operational tasks by a random sample of high school students.
Population

I 1 th Grade (N=99)
Females (N=54)

Conservation
of volume

19

14

26

23

Females (/V=47)

18

16

Males {N=50)

34

20

Males (N=45)

12th Grade (N=97)

The data in Table I suggest that out of the population from
which physics students are drawn, not many are formal
operational. You are urged to administer these tasks to
your students, If you are interested in doing some group
evaluations of your students, study sources three and four
listed earlier. Source three deals with determining student
ability to reason abstractly by presenting a problem and
then providing one clue at a time. The clues and the original statement of the problem must then be analyzed and
used to draw conclusions. Source four assesses student ability to apply the concept of ratio. When using ratios, the
student is utilizing proportional thinking which is an essential component of formal thought. Please do not make the
assumption that by the time students get to physics in high
school only those who think formally enroll. Our high
school data from those enrolling in high school physics,
though not extensive enough to make a definite statement,
suggest that such is not the case. Data will be presented
later which show that many concrete operational thinkers
are found at the first year college level.
Kohlberg and Gilligan report that in a study of the ability
of 265 persons to perform successfully on the pendulum
task (exclusion), these results were obtained:
age 10-15 - 45%;
age 16-20 - 53%;

age 21-30 - 65%;
age 45-50 - 57%.

If you assume that performance on the pendulum task is an
indication that formal operational thought is present, the
foregoing data suggest what our data do - a large percentage of the adolescent population is not formal operational.
Unfortunately, our age ranges and those of Kohlberg and
Gilligan do not coincide exactly, and so no more definite
statement can be made from those two groups of data.
MAY 1973

The data shown in Table I1 clearly reflect that the majority
of college freshmen have not moved deeply into the formal
operational stage of thought - 77 of 185 experiencing success on the exclusion task is not too impressive. We do not
mean to infer that performance on the pendulum task is an
absolute measure of the achievement of formal operational
thought. We do mean to infer that performance on these
tasks is a strong indication of student ability to use propositional logic. We tested our inference that these two tasks
do help isolate formal thinkers - those that use thought
patterns which are "the stock in trade of the logician, the
scientist, or the abstract thinker."' In searching for a test
population we ruled out all quantitative fields because the
tasks are quantitative in nature. We were reminded that the
"if,.., then ..., therefore" construct is also the stock in trade
of the lawyer. In order to survive in the study of law, students have to think mainly on the abstract level. We asked
several groups of second and third year law students'to react
to the two tasks we just described. Table 111reflects our results. A total of 66 students reacted to the tasks and 50 of
them demonstrated formal operational thought. We feel,
therefore, that these two tasks have a good probability of
identifying formal thought.
Table 11 1. Performance of second and third year law
students on two formal operational tasks.
Concrete
Operational

Formal
Operational

Conservation of
volume (N=22)

3

19

Exclusion of
irrelevant variables
(N=44

13

31

What Educational Institutions Can Do
to Foster Formal Thought
Our research has shown us that the level of thought of
junior high school students6 and college freshmen7 can be
changed by providing them inquiry-centered experiences in
science. We believe that the principal reason our research
has shown an increase in the thought levels of students is
because we accepted t h ~most
t
of them participating in the
experiments were concrete operational. That put squarely

upon us the responsibility for providing concrete experiences with the objects and ideas of the discipline. These
students were involved in actually creating some knowledge
of their very own, We know that this was the first time some
of them had been given that opportunity. We believe that
actual involvement with the materials and ideas of science
and being allowed to find out something for themselves accounts for the movement toward and into formal thought
which we found.

take place, and when the present concept needs to be related to the next one by exploration. He must also decide
when exploration of a completely new concept must begin.
This teacher is not a teller, he is a director of learning.
Traditional teaching methods embrace the notions that
(a) teaching is telling, (b) memorization is learning, and
(c) being able to repeat something on an examination is
evidence of understanding - those points are the antithesis of inquiry.

Science teachers in general and physics teachers in particular have a vehicle at their command that makes active stddent involvement convenient. That vehicle is the laboratory.
Both of our research studies had the laboratory at its nerve
center. In the case of the college study that laboratory did
not too frequently involve hardware and chemicals, but it
was a place where data were gathered, ideas were honed,
hypotheses were made and tested, and verifications were
carried out. That is the true laboratory.

The development of formal thought must become the
focus of attention of every teacher in the country. The Educational Policies Comrnission said. in 1961. that the
central purpose of the school must'be to teach students t o
think and they operationally defined thinking.'' Such
good advice! We would add that the central role of the
school must be to teach children to think with form not
objects - in other words, to move students into the stage
of formal operational thought, Science has the structure
to enhance greatly the achievement of this objective. We
must not blow our chances to make a maximum contribution to education in general and education in science in
particular! Let's establish an environment in our classrooms
that encourages and promotes formal thought!

In teaching the majority of physics courses (both college
and high school) the laboratory can be used to lead students, through inquiryY8to develop understandings of the
concepts to be learned. The teacher, then, has three responsibilities to discharge before ever meeting a class:
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Cognitive Development in Children: Piaget
Development and Learning
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My dear colleagues, I am very concerned
about what to say to you, because I do
not know if I shall accomplish the end that
has been assigned to me. But I have
been told that 'the important thing is not
what you say, but the discussion which
follows and the answers to questions you are
asked. So this morning I shall simply
give a general introduction of a few ideas
which seem to me to be important for the
subject of this conference.
First I would like to make clear the difference between two problems: the problem
of development in general and the problem
of learning. I think these probleins are
very different, although some people do not
make this distinction.
The development of knowledge is a
spontaneous process, tied to the whole
process of embryogenesis. Embryogenesis
concerns the developnlent of the body, but
it concerns as well the development of the
nervous system and the development of
mental functions. I n the case of the development of knowledge in children, embryogenesis ends only in adulthood. It is a
total developinental process which we must
re-situate in its general biological and
psychological context. I n other words,
development is a process which concerns the
t.oi.ality of the structures of knowledge.
Learning presents the opposite case. In
general, learning is provoked by situationsprovoked by a psychological experimenter;
or by a teacher, with respect to some didactic
point; or by an external situation. It is
provoked, in general, as opposed to spon'
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taneous. In addition, it is a limited process-limited to a single problem, or to a
single structure.
So I think that developnlent explains
learning, and this opinion is contrary to
the widely held opinion that developnlc~lt
is a sun1 of discrete learning experie~~oes.
For some psychologists development is
reduced to a series of specific learned items,
and development is thus the sum, the cumulation of this series of specific items. I
think this is an atomistic view which deforms
the real state of things. In reality, development is the essential process and cach
element of learning occurs as a function of
total development, rather than hang an
element which explains developnicnt. I
shall begin, then, with a first part dealing
with development, and I shall talk about
learning in the second part.
To understand the developlnent of l;rloWledge, we must start with an idea which
seems central to me-the
idea of an
operation. Knowledge is not a copy of
reality. To know an object, to ki~owan
evenh, is not siniply to look at it and nlakc
a mental copy or image of it. To lirlow
an object is to act on it. To know is to
modify, to transform the objecl, and t,o
understand the process of this transformation, and as a consequence to understand the way the object is constructed.
An operation is thus the essence of lalo~vledge; it is an interiorized action which
modifies the object of knowledge For
instance an operation would co~lsist of
joining objects in a class to co~lstruc*ta
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classification. Or an operation would consist of ordering, or putting things in a
series. Or an operation would consist of
counting, or of measuring. In other words,
it is a set of actions modifying the object,
and enabling the knower to get at the structures of the transfor~nation.
An operation is an interiorized action.
But, in addition, it is a reversible action;
that is, it can tala place in both directions,
for instance, adding or subtracting, joining
or separating. So it is a particular type
of action which inakes up logical structures.
Above all, an operation is never isolated.
I t is always linked t,o other operations, and
as a result it is always a part of a total
structure. For instance, a logical class does
not exist in isolation; what exists is the
total structure of classification. An asymmetrical relation does not exist in isolation.
Seriation is the nahral, basic operational
structure. A number does not exist
isolation. What exists is the series of
nun~berswhich constitute a structure, an
exceedingly rich structure whose various
properties have been 3evealed by mathematicians.
These operational structures are what
seem to me to constitiute the basis of knowledge, the na;tural psychological reality,
in terms of which we must understand the
development of knowledge. And the central problem of developnlent is to understand the formation, elaboration, organization, and functioning of these structures.
I should like to review the stages of
development of these structures, not in any
detail, but simply as a reminder. I shall
distinguish four main stages. The first
is a sensory-motor, pre-verbal stage, lasting
approximately the first 18 months of life.
During this stage is developed the practical
knowledge which constitutes the substructure of later representational knowledge.
An example is the construction of the schema
of the permanent objecb For an infant,
during the first months, an object has no
permanence. When it disappears from the
perceptual field it no longer exists. No
attempt is made t o find it again. Later,

the infant will try to find it., and he will
h d it by localizing it spatially. Consequently, along with the collst~uctionof the
permanent object there comes the co~lstruction of practical or sensory-motor space.
There is similarly the construclion of ternporal succession, and of elementary sensorymotor causality. In other words, there
is a series of structures which are indispensable for the structures of later representational thought.
I n a second stage, we have pre-operational
representation-the beginnings of language,
of the symbolic function, and therefore of
thought, or representation. But at the
level of representational thought, there must
now be a reconstruction of all that was
developed on the sensory-motor level. That
is, the s&ry-motor
actions are not immediately translated into operations. I n
fact, during all this second period of preoperatioil representations, there are as
yet no operations as I defined this term a
moment ago. Specifically, there is as yet
no conservation which is the psychological
criterion of the presence of reversible operations. For example, if we pour liquid fro111
one glass to &other of a different shape,
the pre-operational, child will . think there
is more in one than in the other. In the
absence of operational reversibility, there
is no conservation of quantity.
.
In a third stage the first operations appear,
but I call these concrete operations because
they operate on objects, and not yet
on verbally expressed hypotheses. l7or
example, there are the operations of classification, ordering, the construction of t,he
idea of number, spatial arid temporal opera'tions, and all the fundamental operations
of elementary logic of classes and relations,
of elementary mathematics, of elementary
geometry, and even of elementary physics.
Finally, in the fourth stage, these operations are surpassed as the child reaches the
level of what I call formal or hyp~thet~icdeductive operations; that is, he can nol17
reason on hypotheses, and not only on
objects. He constructs new operations,
operations of propositional logic, and not
,
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simply the operations of classes, relations,
and numbers. He attains new structures
which are on the one hand combinatorial,
corresponding to what mathematicians call
lattices; on the other hand, more complicated group structures. At the level
of concrete operations, the operations apply
within an immediate neighboi-hood: for
instance, classification by successive inclusions. At the level of the combinatorial,
however, the groups are much more mobile.
These, then, are the four stages which we
identify, whose formation we shall now
attempt to explain.
What factors can be called upon to explain
the development from one set of structures
to another? It seems to me that there
are four main factors: first of all, maturation,
in the sense of Gesell, since this development
is a continuation of the enzbryogenesis;
second, the role of expel-ience of the effects
of the physical environment on the structures of intelligence; third, social trans~nissionin the broad sense (linguistic transmission, education, etc.); and fourth, a
factor which is too often neglected but one
which seenzs to me fundamental and even
the principal factor. I shall call this the
factor of equilibration or if you prefer it,
of self-regulation.
Let us start with the first factor, maturation. One might thinlc that these stages
are simply a reflection of an interior maturation of the nervous system, following the
hypotheses of Gesell, for example. Well,
maturation certainly does play an indispensable role and must not be ignored. It
certainly talies part in every transformation
that talies place during a child's development. However, this first factor is insufficient in itself. First of all, we know practically nothing about the maturation of the
nervous systenz beyond the first months
of the child's existence. We know a little
bit about it during the first two years but
wc know very little following this tinze. But
above all, maturation doesn't explain everything, because the average ages a t which
these stages appear (the average chronological ages) vary a great deal from one society to

another. The ordering of these st,agcs is
constant and has been found in all t.he so&ties studi.ed. It has been found in various
countries where psychologists in u11ivc.rsities have redone the experiments hut it
has also been found in African peoples for
example, in the children of the Bush~lial,
and in Iran, both in the villages and in the
cities. However, although the order. of
succession is constant, the chronological
ages of these stages varies a great deal. ]?or
instance, the ages which we have found in
Geneva are not necessarily the ages which
you would find in the United States. In
Iran, furthermore, in the city of Teharan,
they found approxi~natelythe same ages
as we found in Geneva, but there is a systeinatic delay of two years in the childre11 in
the country. Canadian psychologists ~ ~ 1 1 0
redid our experiments, Monique Laurendeau
and Father Adrien Pinard, found once again
about the same ages in Montreal. Hut
when they redid the experiments in Martinique, they found a delay of four years in all
the experiments and this in spite of the fact.
that the children in Martinique go to a
school set up according to the .French system
and the French curriculum and attain a t
the end of this elementary school a ner.t.ificat;u
of higher primary education. There is
then a delay of four years, that is, tfherc arc?
the same stages, but systelnatically delayed.
So you see that these age variations SIIOTV
that maturation does not explain everytlling.
I shall go on now to the role played by
experience. Experience of objects, of physical reality, is obviously a basic factor in
the development of cognitive structur.os.
But once again this factor does not explain
everything. I can give two rcaso~ls for
this. The first reason is that so~ileof the
concepts which appear a t the beginning of
the stage of concrete operations are suoh
that I cannot see how they could be drawri
from experience. As an example, let us
take the conservation of the suhstali(;e in
the case of changing the shape of a ball of
plasticene. We give this ball of plastioene
to a child who changes it.s shape int80 a
sausage form and we ask him if thcrc is Ihe
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same amount of matter, that is, the same
'amount of substance as there was before.
We also ask h p ~if it now has the same
weight and thirdly if it now has the same
volume. The volun~eis measured by the
displacement of water when we put the
ball or the sausage into a glass of water.
The findings, which have been the same
every time this experiment has been done,
show us that first of all there is conservation
of the amount of substance.. At about
eight years old a child will say, "There is
the same.amount of plasticene." Only later
does the child assert that the weight
is conserved and still later that the volume
is conserved. .So I would ask you where
the idea of the conservation of substance
can come from. What is a constant and
invariant substance when it doesn't yet
have a constant weight or a constant
volume?. Through p ception you can get
a t the weight of the all or the volume of
the ball but perception cannot give you an
idea of the iplount of substance. No
experiment, no experience can show the
child. that there is the same amount of
substance. He can weigh the ball and
that would lead to the conservation of
weight. He can immerse it in water and that
would lead to the conservation of volume.
But the notion of substance is attained
before either weight or volume. This
conservation of substance is simply a
logical necessity. The child now understands that when there is a transformation
something must be conserved because by
reversing the transformation you can come
back to the point of departure and once
again have the ball. He knows that something is conserved but he doesn't know what.
It is not yet the weight, it is not yet the
volume; it is simply a logical f o r m a
logical necessity. There, it seems to me,
is an exaniple of a ,progress in knowledge,
a logical necessity for something to be
conserved even though no experience can
have lead to this notion:
My second objection to the sufficiency of
experience as an explanatory factor is that
this notion of experience is a very' equivocal

t
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one. There are, in fact, two kinds of
experience which are psychologically veiy
different and this differeilceis very in~portant~
from the pedagogical point of view. It is
because of the pedagogical importa~icethat
I emphasize this distinction. First of all,
there is what I shall call physical experieuce,
and, secondly, what I shall call logicalmathematical experience.
Physical experience consists of acting
upon objects and drawing some knowledge
about the objects by abstraction from the
objects. For example, to discover that
this pipe is heavier than this watch, the
chid will weigh them both and find the
difference in the objects themselves. This
is experience in the usual sense of the termin the sense used by empiricists. But there
is a second type of experience which I
shall call logical mathematical experience
where the knowledge is not drawn from the
objects, but it is drawn by the actions
effected upon the objects. This is not
the same thing. When one acts upon
objects, the objects are indeed there, but
there is also the set of actions which modify
the objects.
I shall give you an example of this type
of experience. I t is a nice example because
we .have verified it many times in small
children under seven years of age, but it
is also an example which one of my mathematician friends has related to me about
his own childhood, and he dates his mathematical career from this experience. When
he was four or five years old-I don't know
exactly how old, but a small child-he
was seated on the ground in his garden and
he was counting pebbles. Now to count
these pebbles he put them in a row and he
counted them one, two, three, up to ten.
Then he finished counting them and started
to count them in the other direction. He
began by the end and once again he found
ten. He found this marvelous that there
were ten in one direction and ten in the
other direction. So he put them in a
circle and counted them that way and found
ten once again. Then he counted thein in
the other direction and found ten once
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more, So he put them in some other
arrangement and kept counting them and
kept iinding ten. There was the discovery
that he made.
Now what indeed did he discover? He
did not discover a property of pebbles;
he discovered a property of the action of
ordering. The pebbles had no order. It
was his action which introduced a linear
order or a cyclical order, or any kind of an
order. He discovered that the sum was
independent of the order. The order was
the action which he introduced among the
pebbles. For the sum the same principle
applied. The pebbles had no sum; they
were simply in a pile., To make a sum,
action was necessary-the
operation of
putting together and counting. He found
that the sum was independent of the order,
in other words, that the action of putting
together is independent 'of the action of
ordering. He discovered a property of
actions and not a property of pebbles. You
may say that it is in the nature of pebbles
to let this be done to them and this is true.
But it could have been drops of water, and
drops of water would not have let this be
done to them because two drops of water
and two drops of water do not make four
drops of water as you know very well.
Drops of water then would not let this be
done to them, we agree to that.
So it is not the physical property of pebbles which-the experience uncovered. It is
the properties of the actions carried out on
the pebbles, and this is quite another form
of experience. It is the point of departure
of mathematical deduction. The subsequent deduction will consist. of interiorizing
these actions and then of combining them
without needing any pebbles. The rnathematician no longer needs his pebbles. He
can combine his operations simply with
syinbols, and the point of departure of this
mathematical deduction is logical-mathematical experience, and this is not a t all
experience in the sense of the empiricists.
It is the beginning of the coordination of
actions, but this coordination of actions
before the stage of operations needs t.o be
,
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supported by concrete material. Later, this
coordination of actions leads to tho logicalmathematical structures. I believe that
logic is not a derivative of language. The
source of logic is much more profound. It
is the total coordination of actions, actions
of joining things together, or orderitlg
things, etc. This is what logical-mathematical experience is. It is an expe1-iolu:e
of the actions of the subject, and 1101 an
experience of objects themselves. It is an
experience which is necessary before there
can be operations. Once the operations
have been attained this experience in no
longer needed and the coordinations of
actions can take place by themselves in tho
form of deduction and construction for
abstract structures.
The third factor is social transmissionlinguistic transmission or educational transmission. This factor, once again, is fundamental. I do not deny the role of ally
one of these factors; they all play a part.
But this factor is insufEcient because t,he
child can receive valuable inforniation via
language or via education directed by an
adult only if he is in a state where he can
understand this information. That is, to
receive the information he nlust have a
structure which enables him to assimilate
this information. This is why you cannot
teach higher mathenlatics to a five-year-old.
He does not yet have structures whic.11
enable him to understand.
I shall take a much sinlpler example,
an example of linguistic transmission. As
my very &st work in the realm of child
psychology, I spent a long time studying
the relation between a part and a whole ill
concrete experience and in language. For
example, I used Burt's test employing Ihe
sentence, "Some of my flowers are butt(^cups." The child knows that all buttercups are yellow, so there are three possible
conclusions : the whole bouquet is yellow,
or part of the bouquet is yellow, or noilc of
the flowers in the bouquet are yellow. 1
found that up until nine years of age (and
this was in Paris, so the children certaillly
did understand the French language) they
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replied, "The whole bouquet is yellow or
some of my flowers are yellow." Both of
those mean the same thing. They did not
understand the expression, "some of my
flowers." They did not understand this
of as a partitive genitive, as the inclusion of
some flowers in my flowers. They understood some of my flowers to be my several
flowers as if the several flowers and the
flowers were confused as one and the same
class. So there you have children who
until nine years of age heard every day a
linguistic structure which implied the inclusion of a subclass in a class and yet did
not understand this structure. I t is only
when they themselves are in 5.rm possession
of this logical structure, when they have
constructed it for themselves according to
the developmental lqws which we shall
discuss, that they succebd in understanding
correctly the linguistic expression.
I come now to the fourth factor which is
added to the three preceding ones but which
seems to me to be the fundamental one.
This is what I call the factor of equilibration.
Since there are already three factors, they
must somehow be equilibrated among themselves. That is one reason for bringing iil
the factor of equilibration. There is a
second reason, however, which seems to me
to be fundamental. I t is that in the act
of knowing, the subject is active, and consequently, faced with an external disturbance,
he will react in order to compensate and
consequentl~,rhe will tend towards equilibrium. Equilibrium, defined by active compensation, leads to reversibility. Operational reversibility is a model of an equilibrated system where a transformation in
one direction is compensated by a transformation in the other direction. Equilibration, as I understand it, is thus an active
process. It is a process of self-regulation.
I think that this self-regulation is a fundalliental factor in development. I use this
term in the sense in which it is used in
cybernetics, that is, in the sense of processes
with feedback and with feedforward, of
processes which regulate themselves by a
progressive compensation of systenls. This
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process of equilibration takes the fonn of a
succession of levels of equilibriuln, of levels
which have a certain probability which I
shall call a sequential probability, that is,
the probabilities are not established a pio7.i.
There is a sequence of levels. It is not
possible to reach the second level unless
equilibrium has been reached at the Grst
level, and the equilibrium of the third level
only becomes possible when the equilibrium of the second level has been reached,
and so forth. That is, each level is determined as the most probable given that the
preceding level has been reached. It is
not the most probable at the beginning,
but it is the most probable once the preceding level has been reached.
As an exaniple, let us take the development of the idea of conservation in the
transformation of the ball of plasticene into
the sausage shape. Here you can discern
four levels. The most probable a t the
beginning is for the child to think of only
one dimension. Suppose that there is a
probability of 0.8, for instance, that the
child will focus on the length, and that
the width has a probability of 0.2. This
would mean that of ten children, eight
will focus on the length alone without
paying any attention to the width, and two
will focus on the width without paying any
attention to the length. They will focus
only on one dimension or the other. Since
the two dimensions are independent a t this
stage, focusing on both a t once would have
a probability of only 0.16. That is less than
either one of the two. In other words,
the most probable in the beginning is to
focus only on one dimension and in fact the
child will say, "It's longer, so there's more
in the sausage." Once he has reached this
first level, if you continue to elongate the
sausage, there comes a moment when he
will say, "No, now it's too thin, so there's
less." Now he is thinking about the width,
but he forgets the length, so you have conle
to a second level which becomes the most
probable after the first level, but which is
not the most probable at the point, of
departure. Once he has focused on the
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width, he will come back sooner or later
to focus on the length. Here you will have
a third level where he will oscillate between
width and length and where he will
discover that the two are related. When
you elongate you make it thinner, and
when you make it shorter, you make i t
thicker. He discovers that the two are
solidly related and in discovering this relationship, he will start to think in terms of
transformation and not only. in terms of
the h a 1 coniiguration. Now he will say
that when it gets longer it gets thinner, so
it's the same thing. There is more of it
in length but less of it in width. When
you make it shorter it gets thicker; there's
less in length and more in width, so there
is compensation-compensation which defines equilibrium in the sense in which I
defined it a moment ago. Consequently,
you have operations and conservation. In
other words, in the course of these developments you will always h d a process of
self-regulation which I call equilibration and
which seems to me the fundamental f&CtOl
in the acquisition of logical-mathematical
knowledge.
I shall go on now to the second part of
my lecture, that is, to deal with the topic
of learning. Classically, learning is based
on the stinldueresponse schema. I think
the stimulus-response schema, . while I
won't say it is false, is in any case entirely
incapable of explaining cognitive learning.
Why? Because when you think of a
stimulus-response schema, you think usually that first of all there is a stimulus and
then a response is set off by this stimulus.
For my part, I am convinced that the
response was there first, if I can express
myself in this way. A stimulus is a stimulus
only to the extent that it is significant,
and it becomes significant only to the
extent that there is a structure which
permits its assimilation, a structure which
can integrate this stimulus but which at
the same time sets off the response. In
other words, I would propose that the
stimulus-response schema be written in
the circular form-in the form of a schema

or of a structure which is not siniply one
way. I would propose that above aU,
between the stimulus and the respo~lse,
there is the organism, the organism and
its structures. The stimulus is really a
stimulus only when it is assimilated into a
structure and it is this s t r u c t ~ ewhich
s.ets off the response. Consequently, it
is not an exaggeration to say that, the
response is there first, or if you wish at the
beginning there is the structure. Of course
we would want to understand how this structure comes to be. I tried to do this earlier
by
a model of equilibration or
self-regulation. Once there is a structure,
the stimulus will set off a response, but orlly
by the intermediary of this structure.
I should like to present *me facts. We
have facts in great number. -. I shall choose
only one or two and I shall choose sorrie
facts which our colleague, Smedslund, has
gathered. (Smedslund is currently a t the
Harvard Center for Cognitive Studies.)
Smedslund arrived in Geneva a few years
ago convinced (he had published this in
one of his papers) that the developnlent of
the ideas of conservation could be in-.
dehitely accelerated through learning of
a stimulwresponse type. I invited S~nedslund to come to spend a year in Geneva
to show us this, to show a s that he could
accelerate the development of operational
conservation. I shall relate only one of his
experiments.
During the year that he spent in Get~cva
he chose to work on the conse~atio~l
of
weight. The conservation of weight is,
in fact, easy to study since there is a possible external reinforcement, that is, si~nply
weighing the ball and the sausage 011 a
balance. Then you can study the child's
reactions to these external results. Smedslund studied the conservation of weight
on the one hand, and on the other hand he
studied the transitivity of weights, that is,
the transitivity of equalities if A = B and
B = C, then A = C, or the transitivit,jr of
the inequalities if A is 1ws than B, and B is
less than C, then A is less than C.
As far as conservation is conoen~ed,
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Smedshmd succeeded very easily with fiveand six-year-old children in getting them
to generalize that weight is conserved when
the ball is transformed into a different shape.
The child' sees the ball transformed into
a sausage or into little pieces or into a
or into' any other 'form, he weighs
it, and he sees that it is always the same
thing. He will affirm it will be the same
thing, no matter what you do to it; it
will come out to be the same weight. Thus
Smedslund very easily achieved the conservation of weight by this sort of external
reinforcement.
In contrast to this, however, the same
rliethod did not succeed in teaching transitivity. The children resisted the notion of
transitivity. A child would redict correctly in certain cases but he
uld inalce
his predictioil as a possibility or a probability
and not as a certainty. There was never
this generalized certainty in the case of
transitivity.
So there is the first example, which seems
to nze very instructive, because in this problem in the conservation of weight there are
two aspects. There is the physical aspect
and there is the logical-mathematical aspect. Note that Smedslund started his
study by establishing that there was a
correlation between conseivation and transitivity. He began by making a statistical
study on the relationships between the
spontaneous responses to the questions about
conservation and the spontaneous responses
to the questions about transitivity, and he
found a very significant correlation. But
in the learning experiment, he obtained
a learning of conservation and not of transitivity. Consequently, Ire successfully obtained a learning of what I called earlier
physical experience (which is not surprising
since it is simply a question of noting facts
about objects), but he did not successfully
obtain a learning in the construction of the
logical structure. This 'doesn't surprise
me either, since the logical structure is not
the result of physical experience. I t cannot
be obtained by external reinforcement.
The logical structure is reached only through

$,
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internal equilibration, by self-regulatiot 1,
and the external reinforcement of seeing that.
the balance did not suffice to establish this
logical structure of transitivity.
I could give many other comparable examples, but it seems useless to me to insist
upon these negative examples. Now I
should like to show that learning is possible
in the case of these logical-mathematical
structures, but on one condition-that is,
that the structure which you want to teach
to the subjects can be supported by simpler,
more elementary, logical-mathematical
structures. I shall give you an example.
I t is the example of the conservation of
number in the cask of one-to-one correspondence. If .you give a child seven blue tokens
and ask him to put down as many red tokens,
there is a preoperational stage where he will
put one red one opposite each blue one. But
when you spred out the red ones, nmking
them into a longer row, he will say to you,
'!Now, there are more red ones than there
are blue ones."
Now how can we accelerate, if you want
to accelerate, the acquisition of this conservation of number? well, you can imagine
an analogous structure but in a simpler,
more elementary situation. For example,
with Mlle. Inhelder, we have been studying
recently the notion of one-to-one come
spondence by giving the child two glasses
of the same shape and a big pile of beads.
The child puts a bead into one glass with
one hand and at. the same time a bead into
the other glass with the other hand. Tinie
after time he repeats this action, a bead into
one glass with one hand and a t the same t i n ~ e
a bead into the other glass with the other
hand and he sees that the? is always the
same amount on each side. Then you hide
one of the glasses. You cover it up. He no
longer sees this glass but he continues to
put one bead into it while a t the same time
putting one bead into the other glass which
he can e.Then you ask him whether the
equality has been con&rved, whether there
is still the same amount in one glass as in
the other. Now you will find that very s n d
children, about four years old, don't want
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to inake a prediction. They will say, "So
far, it has been the same amount, but now
I don't know. I can't see any more, so I
don't know." They do not want to generalize. But the generalization is made from
the age of about five and one-half years.
This is in contrast to the case of the red
and blue tokens with one row spread out,
where it isn't until seven or eight years of
age that children will say there are the same
nunlber in the two rows. As one example
of this generalization, I recall a little boy
of five years and nine months who had been
adding the beads to the glasses for a little
while. Then we asked him whether, if he
continued to do this all day and all night
and all the next day, there would always
be the same amount in the two glasses.
The little boy gave this admirable reply.
"Once you know, you know for always."
In other words, this was recursive reasoning.
So here the child does acquire the structure
in this specific case. The number is a
synthesis of class inclusion and ordering.
This synthesis is being favored by the child's
own actions. You have set up a situation
where there is an iteration of one same nction which continues and which is therefore
ordered while a t the same time being inclusive. You have, so to speak, a localized
synthesis of inclusion and ordering which
facilitates the construction of the idea
of nunlber in this specific case, and there you
can find, in effect, an influence of this
experience on the other experience. However, this influence is not imniediate.
We study the generalization from this recursive situation to the other situation
where the tokens are laid on the table in
rows, and it is not an immediate generalization but it is made possible through intermediaries. In other words, you can find
some learning of this structure if you base
the learning on simpler structures.
In this same area of the developn~entof
riumerical structures, the psychologist Joachiiri Wohlwill, who spent a year at our
Institute at Geneva, has also shown that
this acquisition can be accelerated through
introducing additive operations, which is

what we introduced also in the expel-inlent
which I just described. Wahlwill introduced them in a different way but he too was
able to obtain a certain learning effect.
I n other words, learning is possible if
you base the more complex structure 011
simpler structures, that is, when there is a
natural relationship and development, of
structures and not simply an exteinal yainforcement.
Now I would like to take a few minutes to
conclude what I was saying. My first
conclusion is that learning of strutrt,ures
seems to obey the same laws a s the nalural
development of these structures. I n ot,her
words, learning is subordinated to development and not vice-versa as I said in the
introduction. No doubt you will object
that some investigators have succeeded
in teaching operational structures. But,
when I am faced with these facts, , I always
have three questions which I want to have
answered before I am convinced.
The first question is: "Is this learning
lasting? What remains two weeks or a
month later?" If a structure develops
spontaneously, once it has reached a state of
equilibrium, it is lasting, it will, continue
throughout the child's entire life. Whcli
you achieve the learning by external reinforcement, is the result lasting or not
and what are the conditions necessary for jt
to be lasting?
The second question is: "How much
generalization is possible?" What makes
learning interesting is the possibility of
transfer of a generalization. When you have
brought about some learning, you can always
ask whether this is an isolated piece in t'hc
midst of the child's mental life, or if it is really
a dynamic structure which can lead t'o
generalizations.
Then there is the third question: "In the
case of each learning experience what was
the 0pera;tional level of'the subject before
the experience and what more co~liplex
structures, has this l~arningsucceeded in
achieving?" I n other words, we must looli
a t each specific learning experience from the
point of view of the spontaneous operatio~~s
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which were present at the outset and the
operational level which has been achieved
after the learning experience.
My second conclusion is that the fundamental relation involved in all development and all learning is not the relation
of association. In the stimulus-response
schema, the relation between the response
and the stimulus is understood to be one of
association. In contrast to this, I think.
that the fundamental relation is one of
assimilation. ~ssimilationis not the same
as association. I shall define assimilation
as the integration of any sort of reality into a
structure, and it is this assimilation which
seems to me to be fundamental in learning,
and which seems to me to be the fundamental
relation from the point of vie of pedagogical 6r didactic applications. \ll
of my
remarks today represent the child and the
learning subject as active. An operation
is an activity. Learning is possible only
when there is active assimilation. It is
this activity on the part of the subject
which seems to me to be underplayed in the
stimulus-response schema. The presentation which I propose puts the emphasis on
the idea of self-regulation, on assimilation.
All the emphasis is placed on the activity
of the subject himself, and I think that without this activity there is no possible didactic
or pedagogy which significantly transforms the subject.
Finally, and this will be my last concluding
reniarlr, I would like to coniment on an
excellent publication by the psychologist
Berlyne. Berlyne spent a year with us in
Geneva during which he intended to translate our results on the development of operations into stimulus-response language, specifically into Hull's learning theory. Berlyne
published in our series of studies of genetic
epistemology a very good article on this
conlparison between the results obtained in
Geneva and Hull's theo:y.
In the same
volume, I published a commentary on
Berlyne's results. The essence of Berlyne's
results is this: Our findings can very well be
translated into Hullian language, but only
on condition that two modifications are
'

'

'
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introduced. Berlyne himself f o u ~ ~these
d
modifications .quite considerable, hut* they
seemed to him to concern more the conceptualization than the Hullian theory itself. I am not. so sure about that. The
two modifications are these. First of all,
Berlyne wants to distinguish two sorts of
response in the S-R schema: (a) responses
in the ordinary, classical sense, which I
shall call "copy responses;" (b) responses
which Berlyne calls "transformation responses." Transformation responses consist of transforming one response of the
first type into another response of the first
type. These transformation responses are
what I call operations, and you can see
right away that this f a rather serious
modification of Hull's conceptualization
because here you are introducing an element of transformation alhd thus of assimilation and no longer the simple association of
stin~ulus-responsetheory.
The second modification which Berlyne
introduces into the stimulus-response language is the introduction of what he calls
internal reinforcements. What are these
internal reinforcements? They are what I
c d equilibration or self-regulation. The
internal reinforcements are what enable the
subject to eliminate contradictions, incompatibilities, and conflicts. AU development is composed of momentary cohflicts
and incompatibilities which must be overcome to reach a higher level of equilibrium.
Berlyne calls this elimination of incompatibilities internal reinforcements.
So you see that it is indeed a s t i m u l u ~
response theory, if you will, but first you
add operations and then you add equilibration. That's all we want!
Editor's nok: A brief question and answer period
followed Professor Piaget's presenIcrtion. Tlre jirsi
question rel&d to the fact that the eight-year-old chdd
acquires wnservation of weQM and volume. T h
question asked if this didn't wntradiet the order of
emrgenee of the pre-operaiional and operational stages.
Piagei's response f o l h s :

The conservation of weight and the conservation of volume are not due only to

'
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experience. There is also involved a logical
framework which is characterized by reversibility and the system of compensations.
I an1 only saying that in the case of weight
and volume, weight corresponds to a perception. There is an empirical contact.
The same is true of volume. But in the
case of substance, I don't see how there can
be ariy perceptio~lof substance independent
of weight or volume. The strange thing
is that this riotion of substance comes before
the two other notions. Note that in the
history of thought we have the same thing.
The first Greelr: physicists, the pre-socratic
philosophers, discovered conservation of
substance independently of any experience.
I do not believe this is contradictory to
the theory of operations. This conservation of substance is siiziply the affiriziation
that something must be conserved. The
children do not know specifically what is
conserved. They know that since the sausage can beco~nea ball again there must be
something which is conserved, and saying
"substance" is simply a way of translating
this logical necessity for conservation. But
this logical necessity results directly froin
the discovery of operations. I do not tlziiili
that this is contradictory with the theory of
development.
Edilor's note: ?'he second question zas whether or not
/he development of stages in children's thinking could
be accekrated hy practice, training, ancl exercise in
perception and memory. Piaget's response follows:

I am not very sure that exercise of perception and memory would be sufficient.

I think that we ilzust distinguish within t,hc
cognitive function two very different aspects
which I shall call the figurative aspect and
the operative aspect. The figurative aspc:c.t
deals with static configurations. In physical reality there are states, and in addition
to these there are tra~lsformations wl~icll
lead from one state to another. In cognitive functioning one has the figurative aspects-for example, perception, imitation,
mental imagery, etc.
The operative aspect includes operatiol~s
and the actioris which lead from one state
to another. I11 children of the higher stagca
and in adults, the figurative aspects arc
subordinated to the operative aspects. Any
given state is understood to be the result of
some transformation and the point of departure for another transformation. But
the pre-operational child does not understand
transformations. He does not have tJll(1
operations necessary to understand the111
so he puts all the emphasis on the stalk
quality of the states. I t is because of this,
for example, that in the conservation experiments he simply compares the initial state
and the final state without being concer11c.d
with the transformation.
In exercising perception and n~emory,I
feel that you will reinforce the figurative
aspect without touchirig the operative aspect. Consequently, I'm not sure that this
mill accelerate the developizlent of cognitive.
structures. What needs to be reinforocd
is the operative aspect-not the analysis of
states, but the uriderstarlding of transformations.

Physics Problems and
the Process of Self .Regulation
Anton E. Lawson and Warren T. Wollman

In two previous articles1q2 Jean Piaget's theory of intellectual
development and its general implications for physics teaching were
discussed. The purpose of this article is to examine more closely one
aspect of that theory and discuss its implications for designing and
using homework problems. We will briefly describe the process of
self-regulation (the process Piaget hypothesizes governs all intellectual
growth) and suggest a way in which homework problems can be used to
provide students an opportunity for self-regulation. Further, we will
discuss deficiencies of typical homework problems and provide a
number of example problems which we believe can initiate
self-regulation. Through the process of self-regulation initiated by
thought-provoking problems, we believe students will not only be able
to develop understandings of the concepts involved but will also
progress from relatively concrete (or limited) to more abstract (or
generalizable) modes of thinking.

The process of self-regulation
The process by which Piaget hypothesizes that patterns of
reasoning are refined, extended, or combined with other patterns of
reasoning is called self-regulation, Initially, basic reasoning patterns
serve to guide an individual's actions within his surroundings. As long as
those actions promote satisfactory interaction, the basic patterns
continue to guide behavior. However, owing to the individual's
extended interaction with his environment he meets contradictions.
that is, situations for which his initial patterns of reasoning do n o t
serve as effective guides to behavior. These contradictions produce a
state of disequilibrium. In other words, his patterns of reasoning are
found wanting and must somehow be changed. If the disequilibrium is
not too great, he will spontaneously begin to alter his patterns of
reasoning in an attempt to assimilate the new situation. The process by
which an individual actively seeks to reestablish equilibrium is termed
self-regulation. The altered reasoning patterns which develop are then
tried. If the patterns guide behavior successfully so that the person's
efforts obtain positive feedback the patterns are reinforced. Continued
positive feedback then produces an increasingly stable set of reasoning
patterns. In this manner the person gradually builds new reasoning
patterns and adapts to new situations.

Homework problems can initiate self-regulation
The gradual process of reestablishing equilibrium through
self-regulation affords the possibility of initiating interactions between
students and subject matter with the use of homework problems
provided the following two factors are present: Problems must be
chosen so that the student can partially but not completely understand
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Typical homework problems seldom require a student
to examine his own thinking.

them in terms of old ideas (i.e., a moderate state of
disequilibrium must result from the problem); and
sufficient time must be allowed for the student to grapple
with the new situation, possibly with appropriate "hints"
to direct his thinking, but allowing him to put the ideas
together himself.
An important facet then in selecting problems which
encourage self-regulation is to obtain a careful match
between what the student knows and the kind of problem
he is asked to work through. The ideal situation would
seem to be one in which the problems are challenging but
are felt t o be solvable. The hypothesis is that a challenging
but solvable problem will place a student into an initial
state of disequilibrium. However, through his own efforts at
bringing together what he has done in the laboratory, read
in the textbook, heard in lectures, learned from other past
experiences, and obtained from teacher or peer discussions
he will gradually organize his thinking about this
information and successfully solve the problem. This
success will then establish a new and more stable
equilibrium. The new state of equilibrium will be one with
increased understanding of the subject matter and increased
problem-solving capability. Before giving examples of the
kind of problem we believe can initiate self-regulation a few
comments will be made regarding deficiencies of standard
homework problems.

What's wrong with typical homework problems?
Typical homework problems seldom require a student
to examine his own thinking, make comparisons, and raise
questions which, in fact, are crucial to scientific inquiry.
These problems usually require students to apply an
equation or sometimes two or three equations to obtain a
solution. Students quickly come to realize that the name of
this game is "Can you discover the correct equation?" This
is a game of recognition-a sort of high order matching
process involving little thought. Although this process can
be an important one, we believe that little if any
self-regulation takes place in this way. Typical homework
problems do not require the student to think about:

1.

2.

The data o f theproblem. Usually there is just the right
amount, no more nor less, whereas in real situations
there is either a dearth or superfluity of information
and the problem is to discover what is relevant.
The approach to the problem. Usually this is
determined by the chapter heading. If, for example, a
mechanics problem can be solved either by Lagrange's
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3.

4.

5.

equations, Newton's laws, or energy conservation, the
choice is dictated by irrelevant considerations, e.g., the
problem comes from the chapter on Lagrange's
equations. It is important for students to learn that
many approaches may seem reasonable and the
problem is to decide whether one is particularly
appropriate.
The tacit assumptions o f a problem-solving strategy,
for example deciding between use of Boyle's law or
the Van der Wads equation. This decision is usually
made for the student, not by the student.
The physical arguments involved in the problem as
opposed to the mathematical ones. Too often
problems are only exercises in using mathematical
tools (a necessary exercise) without ever demanding
that the student try either to arrive at or qualitatively
justify
the mathematical result by physical
(phenomenological)
arguments
utilizing
both
principles and order of magnitude calculations.
Indeed, the physical or intuitive argument often
precedes the mathematical in real research.
The statement of a problem. Problems are tailored to
fit the text when, in fact, the real problem is doing the
tailoring by conceptualizing a real situation in terms of
a model. This involves all of the above points.

How to encourage self-regulation
A few points should be kept in mind when designing,
discussing, using, and scoring problems to encourage
self-regulation:

1.
2.

3.

Open-ended problems (problems with no single
solution) are often excellent tools to encourage
thinking.
Problems which present an apparent paradox produce
disequilibrium and can initiate self-regulation. Paradox
problems by their nature are generally short and
incisive. Leighton in his foreword to the exercise
workbook written to accompany The Feynman
Lectures in physics3 discussed the kinds of problems
which appeared most suitable to him. He suggested
that problems of a kind that are numerically or
analytically simple, yet incisive and illuminating in
content were particularly useful.
To encourage self-regulation it is often helpful t o ask
students to record and hand in all the various ideas
they tried and found unsuccessful as well as the ones
which were successful in arriving at the problem
471

"Real" problems should, and indeed must, involve a
certain amount of trial and error.

4.

5.

6.

7.

solution. Discussions of these steps in an atmosphere
in which these ideas are recognized not only as
worthwhile but as necessary, clue students into the
fact that "real" problems should and indeed must
involve a certain amount of trial and error, albeit
informed trial and error.
albeit informed trial and error.
Have the students search for necessary data so they
examine their conceptualization of the problem.
Either give superfluous data or omit necessary data.
To account for the latter, students should have to
make plausible assumptions or introduce suitable
symbols for quantities that are needed to solve the
problem.
Require students to draw a diagram of the physical
situation. To d o this students have to think deeply
about the spatial relationships of the interacting
objects, and may find discrepancies as they compare
their preconceptions with the diagram.
Provide for a "problem clinic" or tutorial service
where students can get help with problems while they
are solving them, and before they have to be turned in.
Interaction with other persons can be very helpful and
is often even necessary if students are to
conceptualize, then critically analyze their own
thinking.
For problems designed to engage a student over a
period of, say, two weeks, the teacher should consult
with the student several times in order to:
A. Discuss with him his initial approach. If this
approach is reasonable but known in advance to be
inappropriate, the teacher should not intervene at this

8.

point, but rather let the student discover for himself
why the approach will not work.
B. Discuss with the student alternative approaches
both when the initial approach is appropriate and
when it is reasonable but not appropriate. In either
case, let ,the student first discover which approach will
work. Then discuss alternatives, even if the first
approach worked. It may be that he will accept
inappropriate alternatives as reasonable. He may then
discover on his own why they are not.
C. Discuss both semi-quantitative (order of magnitude)
and qualitative arguments anticipating the outcome of
more rigorous approaches. Limiting cases should be
used as a check when solutions to simpler problems
are already known.
D. Discuss alternatives to an inappropriate and
time-consuming approach. This is to avoid having the
student spend too much time discovering the
inadequacies of an approach. Overall, the student
should get from the teacher a feeling for the general
considerations appropriate to choosing and comparing
strategies, i.e., a feeling for the process of inquiry.
Although solutions (numerical or algebraic) should be
provided
for all problems
(not just
the
"odd-numbered" ones), students must understand that
a premature glance at a solution will surely affect their
conception of the problem and distort the problem
solving procedure. Knowledge of the solution can
provide stimulating feedback after the student has
completed and carried through a formulation of a
solution.

Examples of problems that can promote self-regulation
Problem 1 Since the net force on the spring scale shown in
Fig. 1 is zero how can the scale register a
non-zero reading? What does the scale register?
Why isn't it 20 since it is pulled by 10 lbs at
each end?
SPRING BALANCE

Comment: This example, which is especially useful when
associated with a demonstration, illustrates how a little
knowledge can go a wrong way. At first, concepts are
only vaguely grasped and thus over-extended. Here we
obviously have two forces whose sum is equal t o zero
and yet the scale does not read zero. Or, we might think
that each force contributes 1 0 lbs of tension to the scale
to give 20 lbs. These two approaches use unrestricted
(over-extended) concepts which must be coordinated,
via self-regulation, with other concepts, e.g., free-body
diagrams and action-reaction, in order to resolve the
discrepancy.
Fig. 1. Spring balance and suspended weights.
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Problem 2 A capacitor and resistor are connected in a
circuit as shown in Fig. 2. The values are
C = 250 ppf, R = 1 0 000
and E = 400 V.
Initially the switch is closed and then it is
opened suddenly. Use two methods to
calculate the energy dissipated in the resistor
after the switch is opened. Do both methods
give the same result? Should
they give the same result?
~f so, why? ~f not, why not?

a,

Comment: This problem calls for two quantitative
analyses of the same situation. If the student is able to
think of two methods of solution and obtain the same
answer using both methods no disequilibration will
result. However, if two different answers are obtained
the student should check his own work. The discrepancy
could be resolved quickly if the source of the difference
was an error in calculation. If, however, the difference
was due to difficulty in conceptualization, then the
check will promote self-regulation.

Fig. 2. Circuit diagram showing
the capacitor, resistor, switch,
and battery.
--

Problem 3 The gas temperature at one level of the upper
atmosphere is about 1 0 0 0 ~ The
~ . temperature
at the surface of a burning match is about the
same. Yet a person would be very cold in the
upper atmosphere. How can that be?

Comment: This problem presents a paradox because
1 0 0 0 is
~ a~ very high temperature and yet it is "cold up
there." Resolution through self-regulation leads to a
more scientific and less everyday notion of the relation
between temperature and "cold" or "hot."

-

Problem 4 A glass is exactly full of water at OOC and has a
cube of ice floating in it. When the ice melts
(still at OOC) the water will not overflow,
because the ice displaced a volume of water
equal to the volume of the water into which
the ice melted. OK. Let us look at some fine
points. In what direction (slight overflow or
the opposite) would each of the following
affect the result? Give only the direction.
(a) The ice cube contained some grains of sand.
(b) The ice cube contained some air bubbles.
(c) The water (and the glass) were not at o0 to
start with, but were at room temperature.
(d) The "water" is not water at all, but is a
Martini which is close to 0' but, due to its
alcoholic content, has density less than that of
water.

Comment: This problem originally appeared in an article
by Richard ~ r a n e .It,as
~ well as other problems in that
article (for example, problems 8, 17, 18, 26-29), are
excellent examples of problems which will promote
self-regulation. Problems 34, 41, 42, and 4 8 which
appeared in a second article by cranes also are thought
provoking and should encourage self-regulation.

Problem 5 If internal energy is partly molecular motion,
what is the difference between a hot,
stationary golf ball sitting on a tee and a cold
golf ball rapidly moving off the tee.

Comment: Of course, the molecular motion part of
internal energy refers to random motion. Thus,
self-regulation refines or sharpens a global or relatively
diffuse concept. It is typical of students that they only
assimilate parts of a concept at first. By provoking them
to discover or recover all the parts, the concept becomes
more sharply defined.

Problem 6 When a cylinder, open at one end, is placed
over a burning candle which is sitting in a
container of water the candle flame goes out
and water rises into the cylinder. Why does the
flame go out and why does the water rise?
Note: Not all observations are mentioned in
the description. What other observations do
you think you would make if the phenomenon
was observed? Obtain the necessary materials
and try the experiment yourself. Try the
experiment varying the number of candles
used, the amount of water in the container, the
size and shape of the cylinder, the speed with
which you place the cylinder over the candle,
and anything else you can think of.

Comment: This problem is one which often yields a
quick but erroneous solution. Most students will
hypothesize that the candle goes out because it burned
up all the oxygen in the cylinder and the water then
came in to replace the oxygen. Selected items of
information or questions could be supplied at this point
t o provoke students to abandon this idea and continue
their search. For example: What is produced when a
flame consumes oxygen? Two burning candles make
more water rise than one. Small bubbles were observed
escaping from the bottom of the cylinder. Why might
this have occurred? These observations contradict the
initial explanation and should provoke disequilibrium.
Once other explanations are offered they can be
analyzed to determine their suitability. They may lead
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some students to try the experiment to collect further
data. Explanations can then be evaluated in terms of
their compatibility with the data and their compatibility
with physical conceptions.
-

Problem 7 Everyone "knows" that to win a tug of war, a
team has to pull harder than the other team.
What everyone doesn't know is that, in fact,
each team always pulls equally hard, even the
winning team. Under these circumstances, how
can one team ever win (short of the other team
just letting go)?

Comment: Obviously one normally thinks that good
teams pull harder than poor teams and this is why they
win. This problem makes one apply the free-body
diagram method and the action-reaction idea to resolve a
problem already believed solved by common sense but
now made to appear strange. This nonroutine use of
physics concepts makes it more likely they will not be
overlooked in the future.

Problem 8 Polishing surfaces reduces friction between
them unless you polish them extremely well,
then friction will increase. How can that be
true?

Comment: One never expects polishing to increase
friction. Resolution of this paradox leads to better
understanding of the relation of macroscopic effects to
microscopic phenomena, e.g., friction, to microscopic
and molecular interaction.

Problem 9 (a) See Fig. 3a. The focal lengths of two
identical, thin, convex lenses are the same and
measured to be 20 cm each (F1 = 20 cm,
Fz = 20 cm). The two lenses are placed next t o
each other as shown in Fig. 3b and taped
together at their edges only. The focal length
of this combination, F,, is 1 0 cm. Write an
equation that gives the focal length of a lens
combination that consists of two lenses having
identical focal lengths,

Comment: Students will generally solve parts (a) and (b)
with little difficulty. However, they will seldom write an
equation general enough to account for both situations.
The suggestion in part (c) that the equations should be
the same and the student's intuitive feeling that a general
equation could be found, coupled with the original
incompatible equations should produce disequilibrium
and provoke the student to rethink the problem.

(b) One of the 20 cm focal length lenses is
replaced by one having a focal length (F3) of
5 cm. The focal length of the resulting
combination is measured t o be 4 cm. Write an
equation that can be used to calculate the focal
length of a lens combination that consists of
two lenses of unequal focal lengths.
(c) Now check your two equations. Are they
the same? Do you think they should be the
same. If so, why? If not, why not? If you
believe they should be the same but you have
two different equations rethink the problem
and try to reduce the two situations to one
equation.

LIGHT
FROM
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LENS

Fig. 3a. Convex lens diagram
showing the focal point and
\focal
length.

__f

Fig. 3b. Two convex
fastened together.

lenses

Problem 1 0 A student measures his weight by climbing
onto the large platform of a big spring scale. He
takes a step to one side and notices that just as
he started to do this, the scale registered less
than his weight. Before he could puzzle this
through, he noticed that just as he completed
the step, the scale now registered more than his
weight. If there is nothing wrong with the
scale, then what was going on?

Comment: "Weight is weight is weight," a famous poet
might have said. So how can a scale read less than one's
weight? Worse, how can it also read more? Still worse, if
it isn't the scale that must be fixed, then how am I, the
student, to fix my ideas?

Problem 11 A brick is supported by a string A from the
ceiling, and another string B is attached to the
bottom of the brick. If you give a sudden jerk
to B it will break, but if you pull on B steadily,
A will break. Since the force is the same both
ways how could this occur?

Comment: To be most effective this problem should be
demonstrated. Anything actually seen makes a much
greater and longer lasting impression than anything
simply heard or read about. This comment of course
applies to other problems as well. Since the student is
used to thinking in a-temporal terms, he will think that
T H E PHYSICS T E A C H E R

force is force and so equal forces have equal effects. So
how can the string break in one instance and not in the
other? Again, common sense is in conflict with
observation and this use of physics to set the world
straight is likely to be retained.
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The Oersted effect on the overhead
It is well known that the effect on a magnetic compass
needle of being deflected when placed near a
current-carrying wire was discovered by Hans Oersted in
1820. An elementary demonstration of this effect is usually
presented in any course dealing with electricity and
magnetism, and it is a very convincing proof that moving
electric charges produce magnetic fields. Several apparatus
manufacturers* sell a simple device to demonstrate the
Oersted effect t o small classes. The apparatus consists of a
metallic bar bent into a rectangular loop and mounted on
an insulated base with a compass needle suspended at the
middle of the loop. When a large current is sent through the
loop the compass needle will deflect and line up
perpendicular to the loop; i.e., tangent to the magnetic field
line at that position. Reversing the current direction results
in the needle reversing its direction, showing how the
magnetic field direction is related to the current direction
(right-hand rule).
In a large or auditorium-size lecture class it is difficult
for all the students t o see the effect demonstrated by this
small apparatus. Since the overhead projector is used
extensively in such situations it is natural t o try to adapt
this demonstration to the overhead. This is simply
accomplished by replacing the opaque base with one made
of Lucite and securing to it an inverted-U-shaped metal bar
with screw terminals at each end for connection to a
current source. The same compass needle that is used in the
commercial apparatus is suspended under the bar by a
needle point in the same manner as is found in the
commercial device (see Fig. 1). When the apparatus is
operated on the overhead the compass needle deflection is
*For instance, Oersted's Law Apparatus, manufactured by
the Sargent-Welch Company, Skokie, Illinois.
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Fig. 1. The Oersted effect demonstrated in place on the
overhead.

easily viewed by all. A small piece of paper can be taped to
one end of the compass needle as a visible reference. A
further modification (not shown in the figure) uses a
smaller raised Lucite platform to place the compass needle
above the metal bar for demonstrating the circular
symmetry of the magnetic field.
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